Criminal Procedure Cases

Duncan v. Louisiana, Supreme Court of the United States, 391 U.S. 145 (1968): White: A trial by jury is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice," so the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a trial by jury in all criminal cases which would come under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee if they were tried in federal court. Concur Black: Full incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment is to be preferred, but selective incorporation is the next best thing. Harlan, on the other hand, believes that due process is an evolving concept, that there should be no incorporation, and that judges should have descretion to decide what constitutes due process. This gives judges too much leeway, however, and actually constricts on states' rights by allowing a judge to make an arbitrary decision. Dissent Harlan: There is no evidence that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment meant to incorporate the Bill of Rights. At least full incorporation would be internally consistent, but this court has decided selective incorporation. Such a decision ignores whether fairness actually requires a trial by jury by the states, and instead examines the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates such a right.
People v. Brisendine (duplications), 13 Cal.3d 528 (1975): Two officers trekked to a campsite to cite four campers for a campfire in violation of a no-campfire ban. The officers searched the campers' bags for weapons, and found marijuana in an opaque bottle and drugs in an envelope. Held Mosk: The search for weapons was appropriate, as the officers were in close proximity for a while, but the search in the bottle and envelopes that yielded the drugs violated California's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure (Article 1, Section 13). That the California prohibition is more strict than the equivalent Fourth Amendment is no problem, as the state provisions are separate from those of the federal, and in many cases the Bill of Rights derived from those of early state constitutions. Dissent Burke: California's original constitution prohibition against was word for word identical to the Federal Constitution Article Four, so the state prohibition should be interpreted as the US Supreme Court has interpreted that of the federal. To do otherwise would create confusion.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990): A Mexican citizen was arrested by Mexican police and extradited to the United States. US police searched his US apartment. Held Rehnquist: The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply to a Mexican citizen living outside the United States, because "the people" refers to those "who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered a part of that community." Dissent Brennan: If someone is prosecuted under federal laws, they should be protected under the federal Constitution.
Katz v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): FBI placed a listening device on the outside of a telephone booth and recorded a man placing illegal bets. Held Stewart: The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, so analyzing whether a phone booth is a constitutionally protected space is not the correct analysis. The test is whether the person seeks to preserve something as private. Held The requirement that an intrusion must take place before a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred is no longer controlling. Held Recording the conversation violated the Fourth Amendment, even though it was probable an illegal action was occuring, and even though the search was restricted, because the officers did not first request permission from a judicial officer but instead imposed their own restraints. Concur Harlan: This case holds that for there to be a Fourth Amendment violation, there must 1) be a subjective expectation of privacy, and 2) that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. [A "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.] Goldman, requiring physical invasion, should therefore be overruled. There can still be exceptions to the rule of needing a warrant, but this is not one of them. Dissent Black: The language of the amendment itself should be followed, and the amendment refers to searches of physical things. If the framers had wanted to outlaw eavesdropping (available then as well as now), they would have done so.
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992): A family's trailer house was towed before an eviction hearing with the acquiescence of police. Held White: "[M]eaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests" in property constitutes seizure. [The case was remanded to determine if the seizure was unreasonable.]
United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d 1320 (7th Cir.1996): Police asked who owned a bag, and the owner was silent. Held Abandonment does not allow Fourth Amentment protection, because there must be a subjective manifestation of a desire for privacy.
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984): Policemen went around a no tresspassing sign and found marijuana in a field. Held Powell: "Open fields" (which do not have to be "fields" or "open") are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, even if tresspassing is involved, except in the area immediately surrounding the house ("curtilage").
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987): Officers ignored fences and no tresspassing signs to find a barn 60 yards from a home and peered into the barn. Held White: The search was permissible. There are four factors in determining curtilage: 1) proximity of the area from the home, 2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 3) how the area is being used, and 4) the steps taken by the resident to make the area private. Here the barn was outside the enclosure, 60 yards from the house, and there was no indication the barn was used in connection to the house.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971): A third party with whom the defendant was speaking was bugged, transmitting information to the police. Held White: Surveillance via third parties is allowed if the defendant is aware the third party is listening, because the third party might at any time decide to voluntarily turn the information over to the police.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974): The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 required banks to make certain customer transaction information available to the government. Held There is no Fourth Amendment violation, as the customers know the banks are privy to their information, so there is no disclosure interest to protect.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979): Police installed pen registers in phone companies to monitor phone numbers dialed. Held Blackmun: There was no search, as customers voluntarily turn over dialed numbers to the phone company, and there is "no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."
United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955 (6th Cir.1990): Police seized a pager and recorded incoming phone numbers. Held There was no search as there was no expectation of privacy on the caller.
United States v. Chan, 830 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.Cal.1993): Held The possessor of a pager has a privacy interest in the numbers in the pager, and activating the pager to retrieve numbers is a search (although it might not be unreasonable).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988): Officers had a trash collector gather Greenwood's garbage from the curb and the officers then inspected the trash. Held White: Inspection of the trash was not a search, even though a city ordinance required disposal of garbage on the curb, because the owner sufficiently exposed the garbage to the public and potentially to "animals, children, scavengers, snoops," etc.
Connecticut v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 588 A.2d 145 (1991): Held Inspection of a homeless person's belongings constitute a search, even though they are on public property, because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy and was not (unlike in Greenwood) conveying his belongings to a third party.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986): Ciraolo put up high fences to hide marijuana beside his house, but officers flew over and saw it. Held The flight was not a search, as anyone could legally fly over and see inside the fence.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989): Officers hovered at 400 feet in a helicopter to inspect a back yard. Held White: Following Ciraolo, this was not a search as anyone could legally hover over the back yard in a helicopter. Consur O'Conner: The analysis should be on whether public access was ordinary, not legality of public access, but Riley offered no proof this wasn't ordinary. Dissent Brennan: Emphasis should be on whether public access is ordinary. Dissent Blackmun: Government has burden of proof of showing whether public access is ordinary.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983): Police held Place's luggage for 90 minutes until a narcotics-sniffing dog came, which sensed cocaine. Held O'Conner: A drug-sniffing dog is not a Fourth Amendment search, because the investigation only uncovers illegal activity, violating none of the other individual privacy interest. Held O'Conner: Holding the luggage while waiting for the dog to come was an illegal seizure as it excercised control over Place's property.
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986): Government used an expensive camera and flew over a Dow plant, taking pictures. Held Burger: There was no privacy interest from aerial photography in the area between the buildings, so there was no search. (Using highly sophisticated technology not generally available to the public, such as from a satellite, might need a warrant.)
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984): Held Burger: There is no constitutionally protected expectation of privacy for a prisoner's papers or property in a cell. Dissent Stevens: The cell searches and seizures can not be completely "malicious, destructive or arbitrary."
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985): Held White: Students do not waive a privacy interest when attending a public school, and therefore any particular search may or may not be reasonable.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987): Held A government employee has a privacy interest in articles in a desk.
Bond v. United States (supplement), Supreme Court of the United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000): Passenger was on a bus from California to Arkansas when the bus was stopped for inspection by border control. A police officer boarded the bus and walked down the aisle, squeezing the bags in the compartments above the seats to feel what was inside them. The officer felt a brick-like object in Bond's bag which turned out to be methamphetamine. Was this a search? Held Yes. The defendant sought to preserve objects as private by placing them in an opaque bag directly above his seat. This expectation of privacy was reasonable: Although passengers might move the back, most passengers would not feel the back in an exploratory manner. This case is distinguished from Ciraolo and (Riley) in that those cases involved merely visual inspections by the publis, not tactile exploration. Dissent Bryer, Scalia: There's really not any difference between this police search and normal poking and prodding by the public. The distinction between tactile investigation (here) and visual investigation (Florida v. Riley) is illusionary. It wouldn't help to concentrate on the officer's intent, because that would mean police would have to "avert their eyes" from things the public has access to. This case just confuses things. The real solution is for citizens to pack bags with hard sides.
Kyllo v. United State, United States Supreme Court, 533 U.S. 27 (2001): Police officers used a thermal imaging device, not generally available to the public, to determine that a particular area of a home was warmer than another. Based upon this information and utility bills, they secured a warrant and searched the house, finding lamps used for growing marijuana as well as the plants themselves. Is it a search for the government to use a device not generally available to the public to explore details of a home that would not have been accessible without intrusion? Held Scalia: Yes. The home has always been a special place, and after the rule for search went from place to people, the home had special emphasis. It was then still not a search to visually inspect a home. But in this case, technology not available to the public allows looking at a house's contents, getting information usually not available without a physical intrusion. That heat emanates from the wall, making this indirect information, is irrelevant: most information retrieved is somehow indirect. The argument that the device did not detect intimate activities is also erroneous: one cannot tell ahead of time with all devices (and even this one) whether the activities picked up will be erroneous. Dissent Stevens, O'Conner, Kennedy: This observation only involved inferences of information emanating from the walls, so it was not a search. Because the majority relies of general available of the technology to the public, what officers can do will change as soon as this technology is available to the public. The majority hasn't even defined what they mean by "generally available." What happens when there are sensors that replace drug-sniffing dogs (which are allowed), and only sense bomb-making materials?
Rakas v. Illinois, Supreme Court of the United States, 439 U.S. 128: Defendants were in a car owned and driven by another person, when the police stopped it, searched it, and seized gun shells. Defendants attempted to sue because of violation of their Fourth Amendment rights based upon Jones. Do the defendants have standing to exclude the evidence because of unreasonable search and seizure when the items were seized on someone else's property simply because defendants were the "target" of the seizure? Held Rehnquist: No; Jones introduces two alternate rules for standing: 1) automatic standing to those for whom evidence to establish standing is an essential part of the offense charged, or 2) anyone who is legitimately on the premises when the search and seizure occurs. The Fourth Amendment is a personal right, so it requires a direct violation of an individual's right—the "target" theory does not do this, and it would be hard to administer (and widen the exclusionary rule too broadly) because police sometimes gather information that could be used against various parties. The real issue here is not standing—it's better characterized as whether there is a Fourth Amendment violation. Do defendants have a right issue because they were legitimately on the premises, as characterized by Jones? Held No, because they had no privacy interest in the car or the objects seized. Jones simply stood for the fact that someone might have privacy interests even outside their home. However, the "legitimately on the premises" rule of Jones is unworkable because it is ambiguous (it really isn't a "bright line"), so that rule is done away with in favor of a test of whether individual Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Dissent White, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens: The majority decision requires an ambiguous determination of whether private parties have granted defendants sufficient possessory interests to give the defendants a privacy interest, and increases incentives for bad-faith searches because mere passengers cannot complain. [Salvucci finally overruled the "automatic standing" of Jones by saying that one could possess property but not have a sufficient Fourth Amendment privacy interest to be protected.]
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980): Rawlings owned drugs and put them in another woman's purse. The police searched the woman's purse. Held Even though Rawlings owned the drugs, Rawlings didn't have a sufficient privacy interest in the area searched (the woman's purse). [Ownership always provides an interest against unreasonable seizure, but in this case the seizure was reasonable because the property was contraband.]
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980): The IRS was investigating American citizens doing business with a bank in the Bahamas, so when a bank representative came to the US the IRS stole his briefcase and searched it. Held The bank representative had no privacy interest in the briefcase from being searched for evidence against third parties, so the third parties cannot invoke the exclusionary rule, based upon Rakas and Rawlings.
Minnesota v. Carter, Supreme Court of the United States, 525 U.S. 83 (1998): Defendants were in an apartment for approximately 2.5 hours with the permission of the person who resided there, for the purpose of bagging cocaine to sell. A police officer looked through an opening in the window shade and saw the defendants. Did the defendants have a sufficient privacy interest to protect in the apartment? Held Rehnquist: No. There was no evidence of ongoing acceptance by the resident, and they were not social overnight guests as in Minnesota v. Olson. They were there strictly for business, and illegal business at that. The "automatic standing" rule was overruled in Rakas. The Court doesn't need to decide therefore whether the officer's viewing the defendants was a search under the Fourth Amendment, as there was no Fourth Amendment right to protect in the first place for the defendants. Concur Scalia, Thomas: There is no need to investigate legitimate interests of privacy here. The history of the Fourth Amendment application clearly shows that people living in a house are protected but not those who are temporarily visiting. Concur Kennedy Concur Breyer: The question the Court did not address, that of whether the officer's viewing through the window was a search under the Fourth Amendment, should be answered in the negative, as the public could easily have done the same thing, as one person did previous to the officer. Dissent Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter: Even short-term guests in a home should have a privacy interest, as the home is a specially protected place. This does not mean reversion to the "legitimately on the premises" rule or extend to casual visitors such as pizza delivery persons. A home dweller can exclude, as well as include guests, and the included guests have privacy interests.
Johnson v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948): Police officers in the hall of a hotel smelled opium burning near room one, so they knocked on the door, asked to come in, then arrested the woman and searched the residence, finding opium. Was a warrant required? Held Jackson: Yes. The search in question occurred before the arrest, before there was probable cause for the arrest. The whole purpose of the warrant requirement is to have the decision to search made by a neutral judicial member. There are exceptions to needing a warranty (e.g. the suspect is fleeing, the premises is not permanent, such as a car), but this was not one of them.
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995): Held Thomas: "... in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336 (5th Cir.1990): Held The defendant has the burden of proving a prima facie case of officers not announcing their entry.
Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997): One officer dressed as a maintenance man and asked to enter Richards' hotel room. Richards saw an officer in uniform behind the first officer, and quickly closed the door. The police kicked down the door and found drugs. Can Wisconsin have a rule of per se exigent circumstances for felony drug crimes justifying "no-knock" entry? Held Stevens: Wisconsin's rule of per se exigent circumstances for felony drug crimes is inappropriate. Such a blanket exception overlooks the situations in which it isn't needed, and promotes blanket exceptions for other crimes. To justify a "no-knock" entry the officer must have a reasonable suspician that knocking would be dangerous or futile or allow evidence to be destroyed. Was a "no-knock" entry justified in this case? Held Yes. It was reasonable to believe that, once the defendant realized the presence of the officers, he would attempt to destroy the drugs.
United States v. Watson, Supreme Court of the United States, 1976, 423 U.S. 411: Khoury had several times informed a postal inspector of those with stolen credit cards, and this time he said that Watson had one. He met with Watson at a restaurant and gave a signal that Watson had stolen credit cards with him. The inspector closed in, arrested Waton, asked to search his car (Watson allowed it) saying that anything found would be used against him, and found an envelope with credit cards with other people's names on them. Was the arrest illegal without a warrant? Held White: No. In the common law a peace officer may make an arrest without a warrant for 1) a misdemeanor or felony committed in the presence of the officer or 2) a felony not committed in his/her presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest. This has survived basically intact, and many states and federal statutes have accepted it. Concur Powell: This is the first time the Court has come out and said that an arrest without a warrant is allowed even if the officer had a chance to get one. This is strange on its face because there's a higher standard for searches and seizures—after all, an arrest is a type of seizure. The decision is correct, though, because sometimes officers want to wait and watch someone for a while, even if they have a warrant, and after a few days that warrant would have become stale so it would be better not to get one at all, yet they might have to suddenly arrest the person for some reason. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: The Fourth Amendment intended to include persons in seizures. Today many more crimes than in the common law are considered felonies, so simply incorporating the common law rule of allowing arrests without warrants for felonies not performed in the presence of the officer allows it for many more crimes than did the common law. The fact that many have codified the common law into statutes makes no difference. Like Powell said, it's not logical to have a higher standard for search and seizure than for arrest. This wouldn't cause a large burden to police—the FBI already seeks warrants before its arrests. As probable cause for arrest will likely continue to exist, whether a warrant has grown stale will probably be the least of an officer's worries.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): Police officers had assembled enough evidence to arrest Payton for murder without a warrant. No one answered at his home, even though there were lights and music, so officers broke into the house 30 minutes later, finding no one there but discovering a shell casing on the table in plain view. Was a warrant required to enter a home to arrest someone living there? Held Stevens: Yes. The home is an especially private place, and it can't be entered without a warrant unless there are exigent circumstances, such as negative consequences occurring in the time it takes to get a warrant. Officers must have reason to believe the suspect is at home.
United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530 (llth Cir.1995): Held Circumstances must must warrant a reasonable belief that a dwelling is that of the suspect and that the suspect in inside before a warrantless arrest takes place. Here, the suspect's car in the driveway and a porch light on were sufficient to provide reasonable belief.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981): An informant notified the DEA that a federal suspect on drug charges could be found at a certain telephone number, and agents got the address for the number and visited the location with an existing six-month-old warrant. Officers frisked two other men were outside the house, and one of the men's wife came to the door and said that no one else was in the house, but officers searched anyway, finding cocaine. Officers conducted a second search, got a warrant, and searched again, finding 43 pounds of cocaine. Can the house of a third party be searched on the arrest warrant of someone else? Held Marshall: No. An arrest warrant is not specific to one location, and allowing a search of third party houses without exigent circumstances would allow practically any house to be search based upon the arrest warrant for one person. Dissent Rehnquist, White: Fugitives hide and try to escape, and they may even live with third parties for a while.
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990): Held White: An arrest warrant is required to arrest an overnight guest at the home of a third party, as there is a sufficient expectation of privacy.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998): Defendants were arrested in an apartment they used to cut up cocaine. Held Rehnquist: There is no sufficient expectation of privacy to require an arrest warrant.
Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.1971): Held The arrest of a material witness is only allowed if there is probable cause to believe that 1) the testimony of the witness will be material, and 2) it may become impractical to secure the presence of a witness with a subpoena.
Chimel v. California, Supreme Court of the United States, 1969, 395 U.S. 752: Police arrived at the home of the defendant, were allowed in by his wife, and when he came home police arrested him in connection with a burglary at a coin shop. Then they searched his entire house, seizing coins, medals, and other objects. Is the search of the house justified "in incident to a lawful arrest?" Held Stewart: No. When arresting someone, police are allowed to search that person for weapons or evidence that might be destroyed, and to search the area under the "control" of the suspect so that the suspect won't grab a weapon or destroy evidence, for example. But searching an entire house has no relevance to the arrest, and is really no different than searching a person's house after arresting him when he is at a neighbor's house. Dissent White, Black: A search without a warrant is allowed when there is probable cause and getting a warrant is impractical. Many times an arrest will make getting a warrant impractical, because "confederates" of the arrested could come and move crucial evidence.
New York v. Helton, Supreme Court of the United States, 1981, 453 U.S. 454: A policeman pulled over a speeding car, noticed evidence of marijuana, arrested the four occupants, and placed them outside the car away from each other. He searched a jacket in the car and discovered cocaine in a zippered pocket. Was the search constitutional incident to arrest? Held Stewart: Yes. Clarifying Chimel, the entire area of a car (but not the trunk) is within reach of the defendant and therefore lawful for search, even inside containers, because officers and suspects need some clear-cut rule that doesn't require a lot of thought on the scene. Dissent Brennan, Marshall: A "bright line" rule may make things easier but that doesn't mean it's constitutional. Always allowing the search of a car after an arrest is like allowing the search of a house after defendant has left, and it doesn't clarify things like locked glove compartments, hatchbacks, station wagons, and taxi cabs with dividers.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, United States Supreme Court, 2001, 532 U.S. 318: Atwater was driving without a seatbelt for her or her children, even though Texas requires seatbelts. An officer, who had stopped her and issued her a warning for the same offense before, stopped her, arrested her, and took her to jail, where she stayed for an hour before posting bond. (A friend came and took the children before Atwater went to jail.) Is an arrest for a minor offense that is not a breach of the peace a violation of the Fourth Amendment? Held Souter: No. The history of the Fourth Amendment allowed arrests for minor offenses. Atwater's proposed distinction between minor offenses requiring jail time and those that do not is not a "bright line" for officers, as many times the distinction requires an evaluation of facts, such as a specific weight of drugs in question. Many times officers need to arrest those cited to keep them from endangering others, such as the compulsive speeder. Officers have an incentive not to arrest anyway, as this takes up time and resources. Dissent O'Conner, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer: An arrest for a minor offense risks violating an individual's interests of liberty and privacy, as happened here, so the standard should go beyond "probable cause" to "legitimate reason" for arrest, as in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. Here there was no reason to arrest Atwater, as she lived in a town of ~2500 people and she wasn't going anywhere. The majority's view allows abuse by police officers.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925): Police in Grand Rapids had previously tried to arrange a sting operation with two bootleggers, but the deal never went off. They noted the car, and sighted the car going to Detroit. Later coming from Detroit, they saw the car and stopped it. They searched the car and found bootlegged alcohol. Held Taft: (The "Carroll Doctrine") A warrant is not needed to search a vehicle or boat, in contrast to a structure, because the mobility of the object makes getting a warrant impractical, allowing it to go to another locality or jurisdiction. Search is only allowed if there is 1) probable cause and 2) exigent circumstances.
Chambers v. Maroney, Supreme Court of the United States, 1970, 399 U.S. 42: After a robbery, a station wagon fitting the description was stopped, the men inside arrested, and the car taken to the police station. The car was searched and two guns and identification of the victim were found. Was the search of the car constitutional under the Fourth Amendment according to the Carroll Doctrine, even though the car was immoble and in police custody? Held White: Yes. There is little Fourth Amendment differences between seizing a car and holding it until a warrant can be obtained and just searching the car. Concur/Dissent Harlan: Sometimes it is more inconvenient to the suspect to temporarily seize the car than to search it, and other times searching the car is more of an intrusion than a seizure. In the latter cases, a search without a warrant would be an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights.
California v. Acevedo, Supreme Court of the United States, 1991, 500 U.S. 565: Officer Coleman was tipped off that a Federal Express package containing marijuana was to be delivered, so they followed Daza after he picked up the package. Acevedo came to Daza's house and left with a bags that appeared to be from the shipment. Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car. Officers stopped the car and searched the trunk and the bag, finding marijuana. Held Blackmun: Officers may search a car and all containers inside if there is probable cause. United States v. Ross said that generally searching a car allowed the search of a bag found inside. United States v. Chadwick said that a tracked object briefly placed inside a trunk could not be searched without a warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders said that a suitcase being followed couldn't be searched even after being transported in the trunk of a car. This case overrules the Chadwick-Sanders rule, because the distinction between the two positions is too subtle, drawing "a curious line between the search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an automobile." If police want to search a container, they may try to give impressions of searching the entire vehicle so as to justify their search of the container. Concur Scalia: Chadwick-Sanders introduced an anomaly that a warrant was required to search an unlocked briefcase in a car but not a locked compartment of the car as in Carroll. On the other hand, as the dissent says, this decision says that a person walking down the street with a briefcase becomes less protected from a search by placing the briefcase in a car. These anomalies stem from the fact that we're following the precendence that most everywhere a warrant is required, which is not permissive enough. Dissent White Dissent Stevens, Marshall: What's the anomaly in requiring a warrant if the object of the search is the container, not the car in general? The majority creates an anomaly that a person has less protection by taking a container and placing it in a locked trunk than by keeping it with him on the street.
Horton v. California, Supreme Court of the United States, 1990, 496 U.S. 128: Sergeant LaRault searched the house of plaintiff, convicted of robbing the treasurer of the San Jose Ring Club, on a search warrant for search for stolen rings. The application for a warrant had listed weapons. During the search LaRault found the weapons in plain view. He was interested in finding the weapons, so the discovery was not "inadvertent." Does the discovery of materials in plain view have to be "inadvertent" before they can be seized? Held Stevens: No. Inadvertency is a subjective measure, and we're more interested in objective standards of conduct that don't address an officer's state of mind. The specificity of the warrant is enough to prevent general searches without an inadvertency requirement. Held To seize incriminating evidence in plain view, 1) the incriminating character of the object must be immediately apparent, 2) the officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment to be in a position to see the article, and 3) the officer must have a lawful right to access the object. Dissent Brennan: The inadvertency requirement doesn't further privacy interests, but it does further possessory interests. Police might use the lack of an inadvertency requirement to speed the warrant issuance process by only listing a few things they want to find (such as rings), and really search for everything that might be more in "plain view" and therefore not restricted by the search for the warranted items.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987): Arizona police searched Hicks' apartment for a shooter, other victims, and weapons after a bullent went through the floor of the apartment, injuring a man below. Officers turned over a stero that looked out of place, phoned in serial numbers, and found it had been stolen. Held Looking under the turntable was a search, and as there was no warrant the search violates the Fourth Amendment. Seizing an object during an unrelated search must be subject to the same warrant and probable cause requirements as would have been needed had the officers known the object was on the premises to begin with.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993): An officer patted down Dickerson for weapons after he came out of house known for drug activity. After feeling a small, hard, pea-shaped object in the pocket, he examined it with his fingers and it felt like crack cocaine in cellophane. He removed it, and it was crack. Is there a "plain touch" exception to the warrant requirement? Held White: Yes, it's analogous to the "plain view" doctrine, in that something that's discovered by lawful touching (as in Terry, here) that's immediately obvious to be incriminating can be seized. Terry, which allows for body pat-downs for weapons, assumes that touching can lead to reliable identification of artifacts. Did this search adhere to the plain touch exception? Held No, the poking and prodding went beyond the touching search allowed by Terry.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973): California police officer stopped a car early in the morning carrying six men, only one of which had a license. That person claimed the car was his brother's, and when the officer asked if he could search the car, the man complied, opening the trunk. Inside the officer found stolen checks. Can consent, even in the absence of knowledge of a right to refuse, allow a search to proceed in the absence of a warrant without violation Fourth Amendment rights? Held Stewart: Yes. The lack of knowledge that the search can be refused can be taken as evidence to determine the "totality of circumstances" of whether there was consent, but it isn't dispositive of a lack of consent. Here the person wasn't under arrest, there were no threats, and the suspect gave no indications of unwillingness. Consent to a search isn't like waiving rights to a trial, so something like the Miranda warning isn't required, which would be impractical under the informal conditions of most searches. Dissent Brennan: How can someone voluntarily waive a constitutional right they don't know they have? Dissent Marshall: The government should bear the burden of showing consent, which a warning could satisfy.
United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1978): Held One cannot be penalized for refusing to permit a search, and refusal cannot be considered evidence of wrongdoing.
United States v. Gonzalez-Basulto, 898 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.1990): Gonzalez, at the border, was referred to a secondary inspection area to check his immigration papers where he was nervous about a drug-sniffing dog. When asked if agents could open his trailer, he replied, "no problem" and unlocked and opened the trailer. Drug-sniffing dogs found cocaine under the oranges and lemons. Did Gonzalez voluntarily consent to the search? Held Yes, mostly because of the "no problem" statement. Non-exclusive list of non-dispositive factors for determining consent: "(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no evidence will be found."
United States v. Rivas, 99 F.3d 170 (5th Cir.1996): Defendant signed a consent form for search of a house, adding "reluctantly" after the signature. Held Addition of the word "reluctantly" was evidence that the defendant knew he could refuse but chose not to, making the consent valid.
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969): A cousin, who also used defendant's duffel bag, consented to a search of it. Held A third party authorized to use an object may consent to its use.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974): Matlock was arrested on the lawn, and Mrs. Gaff told them she shared the house with Matlock, and she consented to a search. Held Actual authority to access or control property justifies third-party consent, because consent to a search is based upon expectations of privacy, not historical notions of ownership.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990): Police searched the home of Rodriguez after his woman friend, who had unbeknownst to officers moved out of the apartment, gave them permission. Does consent of a third party who had apparent but not actual authority allow a search without a warrant? Held Scalia: Yes, if the belief that the third party has actual authority is reasonable. As in Schneckloth, the voluntary consent to search is not a waiver of constitutional rights. Officers rely on reasonableness to search, not the correctness of their assumptions. Dissent Marshall, Brennan, Stevens: Third-party consent to search is based upon the lack of expectation of privacy of the person being investigated, so there is no search with the consent of a third party with actual authority. If the third party doesn't have actual authority, there would be a search and nothing the third party could say could make the search reasonable.
Terry v. Ohio, Supreme Court of the United States, 1968, 392 U.S. 1: Officer McFadden, a policeman of 39 years, saw two men standing on a corner. One would walk down the street, look in a store window, walk back, and confer with the first man. This occurred between five or six times. A third man came up, talked to them, then left. The first two men continued their actions, then left and met with the third man. McFadden in his experience believed they were casing the store, so he approached them and identified himself as a police officer, asked their names, and then when they "mumbled something" he grabbed one, patted him down for weapons, and found a concealed gun. He marched them into a store, put them against a wall, and found a gun on another one. He never reached under their outer clothes before finding the guns. The men were charged with carrying concealed weapons. Is this "stop and frisk" behavior even within the pervue of Fourth Amendment? Held Warren: Yes. To make distinctions between "stop" and "seize" or "arrest"; or between "frisk" and "search"; is to ignore the protection of the Fourth Amendment from invasion of personal privacy. If a police officer observes unusual conduct that, in light of the officer's experience, is indicative of criminal activity, is a stop and frisk a reasonable seizure and search? Held Yes. The reasonableness of a search can only be determined by balancing the government's needs with the privacy interests of the individual. A police officer can question anyone, and the officer may, without a warrant or probable cause, search the outer clothings of the individual, not to prevent the destruction of evidence, but to ensure his own protection. Each case must be decided on its own facts. Concur Black Concur Harlan: A couple of fill-in points. The officer must have a constitutional right to make a forcible stop in the first place, as anyone can ask questions but not just stop somebody if they ignore the person and keep walking. Secondly, once the officer has a right to forcibly stop a suspect, the right to search must be immediate and automatic to fully protect the officer, as asking a question or two first could result in a bullet. Concur White: A police officer may question anyone at any time, but that person may refuse to answer or even cooperate. In some cases, such as this one, there is reason to forcibly stop the person to question them, but that person still cannot be forced to answer and their lack of answering cannot be used as a basis for arrest. Dissent Douglas: Yes, a stop is a seizure and a frisk is a search. The Fourth Amendment requires there to be probable cause that a crime was committed, is being committed, or will soon be committed or the search and/or seizure will be unreasonable. This stop and frisk was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972): Police Sgt. John Connolly was alone in his car at 2:15am in a high-crime area. An informant came by and said a man was in a car with a gun strapped to his waist, and also had narcotics. Connolly went over and tapped on the window of Williams' car, asking for the suspect to open the car door, and instead the suspect rolled down the window. Connolly reached in and found the gun where the informant said it would be, so he arrested the suspect for illegal weapon possession and searched the car incidental to the arrest, finding narcotics. Was the search based upon an informant's tip reasonable? Held Rehnquist: Yes, the information making the search reasonable doesn't have to be based upon the officer's own first-hand experience. The suspect's rolling down the window instead of opening it gave the officer more reason to fear for his safety. Was there probable cause to search the suspect's person and car? Held Yes, the events surrounding the arrest and the presence of the gun gave probable cause for a search incident to arrest. Dissent Douglas, Marshall: This was an illegal arrest, as there was nothing to indicate that Williams possessed the gun illegally. Dissent Brennan: Terry shouldn't apply to crimes like possession of narcotics, because people will start frisking people just so they can have reason to stop them, rather than frisking suspects as an incident to stopping them. Dissent Marshall, Douglass: Unlike in Terry, the officer had no knowledge of the suspect's previous activites, and was acting solely on the basis of an unsubstantiated tip.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980): The DEA watched a woman arrive on an airplane and suspected that she carried drugs. The plain-clothes approached her and asked her to look at her ticket and, as it had a name different than that on her license, they asked her to accompany them to the airport DEA office, which she did, saying nothing. There they asked her if she would submit to a search, and she did. The DEA found drugs. Held Stewart, Marshall (not majority): No seizure occurred because this was request, not a demand, that occurred in a public place and the defendant was "free to leave" at any time. If the person doesn't attempt to leave, a seizure doesn't occur unless there is some threatening presence, a display of a weapon, physical touching, or the use of language or tone compelling compliance. ["Free to leave" is the "Mendenhall test."]
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983): Plain-clothes policemen in an airport saw someone that fit the profile of a drug courier went and asked him questions as police officers. After noticing discrepancies between his ticket and identification, they told him they were investigating drugs and asked him to accompany them to an office. They didn't return the tickets, and another office brought his bags from the airline without his consent or permission. They asked if they could open the suitcases, and Royer consented. Inside they found drugs. Held White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens: A Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure of Royer and his bags occurred as soon as the officers kept the tickets and took the bags with them to the other room, as he practically could not leave the airport without his belongings. The officers did not inform Royer of his right to decline. There was no probable cause before the suitcases were opened. Without a warrant, probable cause, or exigent circumstances, the seizure was unreasonable. Officers may approach anyone and ask them questions without a warrant, just as anyone else could, and that person may refuse to answer or to even listen, and may go on his/her way. The officer cannot detain the person even for a while without "reasonable, objective grounds," and the person's refusing to listen or answer is not good enough reason.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984): Armed INS officers with badges stationed themselves in a factory, with some agents guarding the exists. The agents would question workers about their citizenship and, if their answers weren't satisfactory, the agents would ask the workers to produce their citizenship papers. Held Rehnquist: Police questioning by itself isn't a seizure, and the people should have known they were free to leave. The fact that people usually consent to questioning doesn't make it non-consentual. Concur Powell: This wasn't a seizure, but this is a close call. Dissent Brennan, Marshall: This was a seizure designed to "elicit prompt answers from completely intimidated workers."
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991): Police with badges, insignia, and a pouch containing a pistol boarded a bus and asked Bostick if they could see his ticket and identification. They were unextraordinary, but they explained they were looking for drugs and asked if they could check his bag. Held O'Conner: "Working the buses" is not per se unconstitutional. Even though the officers were blocking the aisle and Bostick would have been left at the station had he disembarked the bus, he was in this constrained situation even before the officers boarded. This case is analytically indistinguishable from Delgado. Dissent Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens: The majority blames the defendant for his own "sensation of constraint." The defendant didn't really have a choice in staying—that's why the the police do this.
United States v. Drayton, Supreme Court of the United States, 2002, 122 S.Ct. 2105: Brown and Drayton were on a Greyhound bus, and when it stopped in Florida Officers Hoover, Lang, and Blackburn boarded the bus to search for drugs. One sat at the front, not blocking the exit, while two others went along the aisles, not blocking the aisles, asking politely people where they were going and if the officers could search their bags. They didn't wear uniforms, had concealed weapons, and showed their badges. Officer Lang asked Brown and Drayton if they had a bag and if he could search it. He found nothing. Noting they had on baggy clothes, Lang asked if he could check Brown's person. He found containers with drugs strapped to Brown's thighs. They handcuffed Brown and led him away. Lang asked if he could search Drayton, and he consented. Lang found similar containers and drugs. Held Kennedy: Lack of an explicit warning does not by itself make questioning or consentual search and seizure unconstitional. Whether there is a search and seizure is based upon a totality of circumstances (Bostick). Whether the encounter is consentual is "whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter" (Bostick). Was there a seizure? Held No. The officers were not obstructing the exit, did not make a general announcement, and were not in uniform. If this had taken place outside the bus there would be no question that no seizure had taken place. On a bus perhaps people have even more comfortably not consent, as they have peers close by them. Was there a search? Held No, as with seizure, everything indicates that the defendant consented. Once Brown was arrested, this gave Drayton even more of an incentive not to consent. Dissent Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg: On a bus, the situation is more like being in a small alley surrounded by three officers than being approached on the street by a single officer, and only an uncomprehending person on this bus would have thought that cooperation was optional.
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989): Police set up a roadblock near a curve, and the suspect rammed into the cars and was killed. Did a seizure occur? Held Scalia: Yes; a seizure occurs when the police 1) intend and 2) cause a suspect's mobility.
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991): A group of youths were gathered around a car and fled when police arrived. One threw away a small rock. An officer tackled and handcuffed Hodari, and the rock turned out to be cocaine. Does it constitute seizure when an officer pursues someone who does not cooperate with questioning? Held Scalia: No. There are two types of seizure: 1) physical seizure, and 2) seizure by display of authority. The former is seizure on its face, but the latter is not seizure if the subject does not yield. Dissent Stevens, Marshall: The standard should be the same for both types of seizure. Otherwise, with the majority's rule, an officer cannot know ahead of time whether conduct would constitute a search, without knowing how the subject reacts to the display of authority. It allows officers to abuse the rule by displaying authority and waiting to see how subjects react.
Florida v. J.L., Supreme Court of the United States, 2000, 529 U.S. 266: An anonymous caller told the police that a black male in a plaid shirt at a certain bus stop was carrying a gun. Officers found a person matching that description and, after searching him and his two companions, found a gun on him. Is an anonymous tip alone sufficient to warrant a police stop and frisk? Held Ginsburg: No. Anonymous tips are unreliable and offer no information on the track record of the informant. Tips must be held to the same standards of reliability as other indications. Was the tip reliable because the description matched the youth? Held No, because the description was of readily identifiable attributes. Should there be a firearm exception to the rule against stops and frisks on anonymous tips? Held No, this would allow people to harrass others, and the risk does not justify such an intrusion. Concur Kennedy, Chief Justice: Even though an anonymous tip alone is not sufficient, there may be other indications that show an anonymous tip is more reliable, such as someone calling and predicting criminal activity several times in a row.
United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.l982): Held Just because a particular characteristic is on a profile doesn't give reasonable suspicion because a profile doesn't take all the circumstances into account. One can't be stopped just because one of their characteristics is on a profile. On the other hand, a characteristic's appearing on a profile doesn't preclude it from being used to provide reasonable suspician for a stop.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000): A group of police vehicles swarmed around a location in a high-crime area, and Wardlow ran away. Officer Nolan caught up with him and frisked him, finding a handgun. Held Rehnquist: Flight from police can be used along with other circumstantial evidence, such as presence in a high crime area, to bring reasonable suspician. "Headlong flight ... is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such."
New York v. Burger, Supreme Court of the United States, 1987, 482 U.S. 691: Burger owned a junkyard. Officers came by to inspect records and the property according to statute. Burger had no records, and police found stolen cars. Did the warrantless administrative search violate the Fourth Amendment? Held Blackmun: No, certain closely-regulated businesses have a reduced expectation of privacy, measured in part by how long the industry has been regulated. 1) There must be a "substantial" government interest in the regulatory scheme the inspections uphold. 2) Warrantless inspections must be necessary to further that scheme. 3) The inspection program must provide a substitute for a warrant in terms of the certainty and regularity of application, by making sure the owner knows he/she is subject to searches, and restrictin the scope of the search to the regulatory scheme. Held The junkyard search doesn't just have a penal purpose—there is a regulatory purpose as well. Held It's not a problem that police officers were conducting the search. Police officers have lots of jobs. Dissent Brennan, Marshall, O'Conner: This ruling makes warrantless administrative searches the rule. 1) This wasn't a pervasively regulated industry. An owner must pay a fee, keep a police book, and allow inspections. If that's a regulated industry, almost everything fits that criteria. 2) There's no certainty or regularity to the searches—there can be as many or as few as the police want. The scope wasn't limited as, police checked numbers of a walker and a wheelchair. 3) (not O'Conner) The search was for criminal activity, not for administrative purposes. After all, once Burger stated that he had not registered to dismantle vehicles and did not keep a police book, he had violated every single administrative rule of the statute—any further search had to be for criminal activity outside of the administrative scheme.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985): School administration officials searched a girl's handbag on only a reasonable suspician, not probable cause, that she had cigarettes. Held The state had "special needs" allowing the search, in order to maintain a safe and healthy learning environment.
Lewis v. School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1993): Brian Cornfield was outside the classroom when he wasn't supposed to be. The teacher's aide thought she saw a bulge in his crotch area, and suspected he might be hiding drugs. Two mail school officials took him to the locker room and strip searched him, then let him wear gym clothes while they searched his clothes. No body cavity search was performed. Held The search was reasonable, even without probable cause. The searchers, both male, made sure no one else was present, allowed him to wear gym clothes while they searched his clothes, and didn't do a body cavity search.
DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571 (4th Cir.1998): During lunch, a girl left her shoes on the top of her desk, and when she came back they were gone. Witnesses noticed no one in the classroom who was not enrolled in the class except one student. Dean of Students James Lee announced a search DesRoches refused, even after being notified that he would be suspended for 10 days according to school policy for not complying. Lee searched all 18 other students, finding nothing, then took DesRoches to the office, called his parents, and finally suspended him. Was there reasonable suspician for a search? Held Yes, because the reasonableness standard didn't apply until the actual point that DesRoches was suspended, and by that time by process of elimination there was suspician that either DesRoches or the unnamed student was the thief.
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, Supreme Court of the United States, 1995, 515 U.S. 646: Vernonia over the past few years had experienced a discipline problem which it attributed to drugs. Vernonia implemented a random drug testing policy for athletics, in which 10% of students would be randomly selected for urinalysis: males with their backs to the male monitor, females inside a stall with the monitor outside listening. Held Scalia: Random drug searches in school are reasonable and therefore constitutional. This is a case of state "special needs" for which there is no need of individualized suspician. The state has an interest in school discipline and student health. Minors lose some liberty rights, and while in school the school is in loco parentis. Students taking part in athletics give up some privacy—consider the shared showers and the stalls without doors—and the tests only look for drugs. Held Drug testing on individualized suspician would cause more problems because of the spectre of bias and by giving a "badge of shame". Concur Ginsburg: As this drug testing only applies to athletics who voluntarily participate, the opinion does not address random drug tests of all students. Dissent O'Conner, Stevens, Souter: Mass searches without individualized suspician should only be available as a last resort, such as when it is impossible to test train drivers for drugs at crash sites as in Skinner.
Chandler v. Miller, Supreme Court of the United States, 1997, 520 U.S. 305: Georgia mandated a drug test for certain top-level officials, including governors, to take place within 30 days of candidacy in the privacy of the individual's doctor's office. Held Ginsburg: While the tests themselves are well-designed if such tests were to be reasonable, requiring drug tests of public officials is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. There must be some "special needs" beyond the normal need of law enforcement in order to allow searches without individidualized suspician. Here there was no problem of drug abuse by officials, and officials do not perform the sort of high-risk, sensitive work that woudl require individualized drug testing without individualized suspicion. Dissent Rehnquist: Just because the Georgia tests were novel doesn't make them unconstitutional, and just because there is no drug problem now among holders of public office doesn't mean that Georgia can't be proactive.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979): Held Officers may not make ad hoc individual stops just to check license and registration, although this doesn't preclude a roadblock stopping everyone. Dissent Rehnquist: Why is better to stop everyone than just one person?
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990): Held Rehnquist: Temporary roadblock searches for drunk drivers are constitutional. No "special needs" beyond law enforcement are needed because, relying on Terry, the stops were not intrusive and balance the interests of the state to address intoxicated driving against those of the individual. Dissent Brennan, Marshall: Some sort of individualized is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Dissent Stevens, Brennan, Marshall: Unlike a permanent, fixed checkpoint the police have extremely broad discretion in determining the timing and placement of the roadblock.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973): Officer searched a car involved in a collision in which the driver was hospitalized, looking for the driver's service revolver. The hospitalized driver was a Chicago policeman. Bloodstained clothes were found in the trunk, and the driver was convicted of murder. Held Rehnquist: The initial intrusion was reasonable as a "community caretaking function," and it was allowed to find the evidence in plain sight.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976): A car was impounded for a parking violation, and a warrentless inventory search revealed marijuana in the glove compartment. Held Burger: State interests balance out above intrusion: 1) protection of the police department from false property claims, 2) protection of the property interests of the owner, and 3) protection of the police and public from dangerous items. Concur Powell: 1) This is a non-criminal search, so there are no special facts for a neutral party to evaluate. 2) There is no danger of discretionary searches because there is a standard procedure. 3) The searches are not arbitrary when all seized cars are searched. Dissent Marshall, Brennan, Steward, White: There's no "special need" justifying a warrantless, suspicionless search. 1) There is no threat of danger over any other car. 2) South Dakota state law protects officers from property claims, and a search doesn't stop claims that theft occurred before the search. 3) If the property owner feels that a search can best protest his/her property, he will consent to the search.
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983): A man was arrested for disturbing the peace, and at the station his bags were searched. Held Burger: The search of the bag at the station house was reasonable for the same reasons as in South Dakota v. Opperman.
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987): Held Rehnquist: Police can inventory the contents of a van, including a closed backpack and a nylon bag. Police don't have to allow the driver to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of the car, they have discretion not to just lock it up and leave it in the parking lot, and they can open closed containers for inventory purposes according to police procedure.
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990): Held Rehnquist: To open a locked suitcase, Colorado v. Bertine says that police regulations must state that all locked containers must be opened to avoid discretion.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928): Held Taft: Intercepting voice communications on a telephone line outside the house doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment. Dissent Brandeis, Holmes: There is a right to be left alone.
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942): Held Placing a dictaphone against a wall doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment because there is no tresspass.
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952): Held Wiring an officer for sound doesn't violate the Fourth Amendment, as there was no tresspass and it was no different than using binoculars.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961): Held A foot-long spike with a microphone placed under a baseboard touching a heating duct using the house as a sounding board violated the Fourth Amendment, not because of tresspass, but because of intruding upon a constitutionally protected area.
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963): IRS officer wore a wire to record an unsolicited bribe he had already reported to his superiors. Held There is no Fourth Amendment violation, because the wire records what the officer had a right to hear anyway, and will prove more accurate in court than the officer's memory.
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966): An undercover officer contacted Lewis about purchasing marijuana, and Lewis invited him into his home to conduct the deal. Held Warren: The communication was not protected by the Fourth Amendment, because Lewis invited the officer into his home to conduct illegal activity.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921): An undercover officer pretended to be on a social visit and rifled through papers while Gouled was away. Held The search violates the Fourth Amendment because the search went beyond the scope of the invitation.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966): Union leader James Hoffa invited a union official to his hotel room and spoke to him about bribes. Held Stewart: Hoffa was not in a protected area, because he relied on his "misplaced confidence" that the agent would not tell what he heard.
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967): Held Clark: A New York eavesdropping statute was not constitutional because it didn't require a crime to be named, there was no description of the particular conversation sought, and the length of time allowed (two months) was too extensive.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914): Held Evidence seized by federal officers for federal trial in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used as evidence.
Wolf v. Colorado, Supreme Court of the United States, 1949, 338 U.S. 25: Held Frankfurter: The Fourth Amendment doesn't require exclusion of evidence wrongly obtained, because there are other methods of punishing wrongful seizures that, correctly and consistently enforced, still meet Due Process requirements. Indeed, the exclusionary rule has limitations, including that it only punishes searches that result in incriminating information. Dissent Murphy, Rutledge: Alternative remedies, including criminal prosecution of police and civil actions in tresspass, are "illusory" and only the exclusionary rule provides adequate deterrance.
Mapp v. Ohio, Supreme Court of the United States, 1961, 367 U.S. 643: Held Clark: As the Fourteenth amendment applied the constitutional right to privacy to the states, all evidence illegally obtained must be excluded from state trials as well. Dissent Harlan, Frankfurter, Whittaker: The exclusionary rule should not be extended to the states simply for "procedural symmetry." A much worse problem deserving of the exclusionary rule is that of coerced confessions.
Brown v. Illinois, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975, 422 U.S. 590: Richard Brown was climbing the stairs to his apartment when two detectives arrested him at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and took him to the station for questioning. The detectives gave two Miranda warnings, one 90 minutes and the other seven hours after the arrest, and both times Brown confessed. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the arrest was without probable cause. Do the Miranda warnings allow the confessions to be introduced as evidence, even though they were the result of an illegal arrest? Held Blackmun: No. Just because the Miranda warning is sufficient to prevent evidence exclusion under the Fifth Amendment doesn't make it dispositive in allowing evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The test of whether evidence can be introduced that would not come to light but for illegal police actions, as in Wong Sun, is whether the evidence was produced by exploiting the illegality or "by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint," some element that shows free will on the part of the defendant. The Miranda warning can only be evidence of this and cannot be a per se rule. Here the confessions were made shortly after the arrest and were clearly the result of an investigative arrest. Concur Powell, Rehnquist: While the Miranda warning can not be a per se rule to allow evidence inclusion, the case should be remanded to determine if in this case it provided enough to separate the confession from the arrest. The Miranda warning cannot be enough for "fragrant violations" of the Fourth Amendment, is enough for "technical violations," and may or may not be enough for the in-between cases.
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980): Rawlings and others were improperly detained while police went to get a warrant, and Rawlings confessed after evidence was discovered. Held Rehnquist: The confession is admissable. The improper detention was in a "congenial atmosphere," and the confession was apparently spontaneously made of free will after the evidence was found.
New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990): Police searched Harris' home without a warrant in violation of Payton, and there arrested Harris with probable cause. After reading Harris the Miranda warning, Harris confessed. Held White: This was an illegal search of the home under Payton, but if the arrest was with probable cause the illegal search doesn't taint the confession.
United States v. Beltran, 917 F.2d 641, 645 (1st Cir.1990): Police without a warrant arrested Beltran in her home, saw cocaine in plain view, and took Beltran to the station. Beltran made incriminating statement after she arrived at the station. Held Whether Harris applies turns on when police seized the items and what motivated Beltran's confession.
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978): An officer stopped by Ceccolini's flower shop and talked to a friend. The officer illegally picked up and opened an envelope that contained money and gambling slips. The friend, without knowing of the envelope, testified against Ceccolini. Is the witness the fruit of the illegal search? Held Rehnquist: No. Live witnesses should not be excluded unless there is a "very close and direct link" between the illegal search and the witness' testimony, because the free will of the witness usually breaks the causal chain from the illegality of the search. Concur Burger: The testimony of a live witness should never be suppressed. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: Both witnesses and inanimate objects are fruit of an illegal search, and both should be excluded.
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980): In between an illegal arrest and testimony, police photographed defendant, conducted a photo identification session with the victim, and ordered a lineup. Held Brennan: A person brought to trial following an illegal arrest can be identified in trial if the in-court identification is free from the taint of the illegal arrest. Here, neither the victim's presence to testify, the victim's ability to reconstruct the crime, nor the defendant's presence were from the exploitation of the illegal arrest.
United States v. Leon, Supreme Court of the United States, 1984, 468 U.S. 897: Officer Rombach obtained a seemingly valid search warrant after receiving information from an informant and after other investigation. Rombach in good faith acted on the warrant and uncovered much evidence. The warrant turned out to not have had the probable cause needed for issuance. Should evidence be suppressed when a search was conducted without probable cause, even though the officer objectively acted in good faith? Held White: No. The Fourth Amendment does not require an exclusionary rule. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to right the wrong to an individual of an illegal search, but to deter officers from making illegal searches. The exclusionary rule offers no deterrance to an officer acting in good faith, and excluding evidence would not effectively deter the neutral magistrate issuing the warrant. Concur Blackmun: This decision must be provisional; if police officer conduct is changed by this decision, it will have to be reversed. Dissent Brennan, Marshall: The majority assumes that the wrong of an illegal search is fully accomplished in the search itself. In reality, the allowing the evidence in court is a continuing part of the injustice performed by the original illegal search. The exclusionary rule is meant to further the Fourth Amendment throughout the judicial system, not just to punish overreaching officers. In addition, it's likely that a good faith exception will encourage officers to submit inadequate evidence to a magistrate, knowing that as long as the magistrate approves the evidence will be allowed, and encourage magistrates to issue warrants without probable cause, knowing that their decision will be insulated from review. Dissent Stevens: The whole purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unlawful searches, and it was created because of general warrants being issued. If there was no probable cause in the first place, then it's a paradox to think that an officer could reasonably rely on a warrant that did not have probable cause. The majority's decision promotes warrant applications when probable cause is in doubt, in hopes that a magistrate will "take the bait." The decision removes all remedy for certain Fourth Amendment violations.
United States v. Payner, 447 US 727 (1980) (duplicated materials): Jack Payner was charged with tax evasion, and evidence of his bank account in the Bahamas was introduced. The evidence had been obtained through an illegal search of a banker's briefcase. The government affirmatively counsels agents to conduct these unlawful searches to secure evidence against third parties. Should the evidence against Payner be excluded because the search violated the Fourth Amendment, even though Payner's rights were not violated? Held Powell: No. This would be giving the court an arbitrary supervisory power outside the Fourth Amendment in instances where the defendant has no standing under the Fourth Amendment. Dissent Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun: The government knowingly participated in illegal activities, as the Court of Appeals noted, "motivated by an intentional had faith hostility to a constitutional right." Excluding evidence from such outrageous behavior is exactly what the court's supervisory powers are for. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to reel in the government, not to protect citizens' rights, then why does exclusion turn on individual standing?
United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir.1995): Held There are two exceptions to the rule that searches by foreign police officials do not constitute a "state action" prohibited under the Bill of Rights: 1) When the action is so extreme that it shocks the judicial conscience, evidence can be denied, not because of the Fourth Amendment but through supervisory powers to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. 2) When United States' agents participation is so substantial to constitute a joint venture.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886): At a forfeiture hearing the court required defendant to produce an invoice that proved the defendant had intended to defraud the revenue, making the defendant subject to forfeiture. Held Civil hearings that hinge on criminal activity are enough like criminal proceedings that the Fifth Amendment applies. Held Producing incriminating business records is in effect forcing someone to witness against themselves.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892): Held A grand jury investigation is a "criminal case" to which the Fifth Amendment applies. Held A person may not be compelled to give testimony that could be used against them in any future criminal prosecution.
United States v. L. O. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980): Held A statute imposing penalties on releasing hazardous materials into navigable waters was civil and not "quasi-criminal" as in Boyd, because the penalties had no correlation with the costs of enforcing the law, and the civil and criminal remedies are contained in separate statutes enacted 70 years apart.
Schmerber v. California, Supreme Court of the United States, 1966, 384 U.S. 757: Defendant had an automobile accident, and in the hospital he was compelled to give blood, which showed him to be intoxicated. Does the compelling of giving blood, which will be used in testimony by others, violate the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelling self-incrimination? Held Brennan: No, "... the privilege has never been given the full scope which the values it helps to protect suggest." The Fifth Amendment only protects "communications" or "testimony," and does not preclude compelling "real or physical evidence" such as submitting to fingerprints, assuming a stance, measurements, etc. Dissent Douglas, Black: The evidence compelled was both communicative and testimonial, as the blood was extracted to communicate to an analyst so that he or she could testify in court.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990): Police transported Muniz to a booking center after he failed a sobriety test, and they asked him, among other things, the date of his sixth birthday. [As there had been no Miranda reading, the question was a compulsion.] Muniz had slurred speech when he answered that he did not know the date of his sixth birthday. Held Brennan: Evidence of Muniz' slurred speech is admissible, because information gathered is not the actual content of his speech, but the method in which he says it. Held Muniz' answer concerning the date of his sixth birthday is not admissible because it is testimonial. It forces Muniz confront the trilemma of truth (he didn't know), falsity (guessing), or keeping silent. Dissent Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens: If eyesight were relevant, the suspect could be compelled to answer what he/she saw on an eyechart, even though this forces the suspect to confront a trilemma of truth (not knowing), falsity (guessing), or keeping silent. What is the difference, and why wouldn't that be testimonial, based upon the majority's reasoning?
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988): Defendant was forced to sign a form authorizing release of bank records. Held The writing was not testimonial. To be testimonial, communication must explicitly or implicitly assert a fact that can be true or false. This was just an authorization for bank records that may or may not exist.
Fisher v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 1976, 425 U.S. 391: A taxpayer was compelled to produce taxpapers produced by an accountant. Held Producing documents created by the accountant is not compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment unless the taxpayer is compelled to write the papers or to vouch for their authenticity. Held It is not self-incrimination from admitting that the papers exist and that they are authentic, because this is nearly self evident—whether they exist could be got from the accountant, and the accountant knows their veracity. (Whether production of private papers would be privileged is not examined.)
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984): Held Powell: Production of voluntarily created personal business documents is not self-incrimination because the government did not force the individual to create the records in the first place.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959): Defendant was indicted for murder and turned himself in. His attorney told him to answer no questions. Police questioned him for hours into the night, denied his requests to talk to his attorney, and called in defendant's friend in the police force to falsely tell him that a previous telephone call from the defendant had put the officer's job in jeopardy. Held Warren: The confession should not be allowed under the Due Process Clause because it was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. Defendant was young, foreign-born, relatively uneducated, was not allowed to see his attorney, was fatigued, and was coerced by the false statements of a friend until his will was broken.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957): The McNabb/Mallory rule precludes confession evidence obtained when the suspect in federal custody on federal charges is delayed being presented to a judicial officer for a preliminary hearing. This is not a constitutional rule, so it was not applied to states. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (1968) made this length of time merely another factor in the totality of circumstances voluntariness test, and prevented throwing out a confession solely because of delay if the confession was voluntary and the delay was under six hours.
Miranda v. Arizona, Supreme Court of the United States, 1966, 384 U.S. 436: Held Warren: Any inculpatory or exculpatory statements made while having their freedoms restricted in any way by the police may not be used unless safeguards are used to ensure the privilege of self-incrimination is upheld. Spedifically, the accused must be informed that he/she has the right to remain silent, that anything said can and will be used against him/her in court, and that has the right to have an attorney present and if he/she cannot afford one an attorney will be appointed. If the accused at any time indicates they wish questioning to stop or wish to have an attorney present, questioning must end until an attorney is present. Answering some questions does not deprive the accused from later invoking these rights. An individual may waive these rights, but there is a "heavy burden" upon the government to show that the assused knowingly and intelligently waived these rights. (There may be other ways than these warnings to inform the accused of their rights, but until methods are shown that are at least as effective as these, these rules must be followed.) Dissent Harlan, Stewart, White: This decision prevents the police from using any pressure to obtain a confession. Requiring a lawyer be provided in a police station goes beyond the normal attorney requirement, which was imposed because of the intricacies of a legal proceeding, not a police station. Dissent White, Harlan, Stewart: This is new public policy-setting law, not interpretational law. The ruling is irrational; it allows questioning with an attorney present, but if an attorney is present, how is the accused any less compelled? If a confession is always compelled, then why isn't a waiver always compelled? The result of this ruling is that no evidence from the accused may be used against him/her.
Dickerson v. United States, United States Supreme Court, 2000, 530 U.S. 428: Dickenson was indicted for bank robbery, and confessed voluntarily but Miranda rights had not been read. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that under 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the admissability of a confession turns only on whether it is voluntary, and Miranda rights need not be read. Held Rehnquist: Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not override, and we decline to overrule Miranda. All recent cases concernining voluntariness were really talking about due process, and we've said that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination privilege through due process. The Court would not have applied Miranda to state court proceedings if the ruling had been merely supervisory. Just because we make exceptions to Miranda means only that a constitutional rule is not immutable. Other methods are not as adequate as the Miranda rights. Miranda has become embedded in police practice and national culture. Dissent Scalia, Thomas: The majority never comes out and says that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is unconstitutional, because it can't. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 prevents exactly what the constitution prevents: involuntary confessions. Miranda represents not just a protection against involuntary confessions, but a hostility towards confessions. Supreme Court cases after Miranda were based upon the idea that failure to provide a Miranda warning is not in itself a violation of the constitution. Arguing that Miranda announces a constitutional rule because it has been applied to the states doesn't help—either those states will have to be reconsidered if it isn't, and if Miranda is a constitutional rule the cases that say it isn't constitutionally necessary will have to be reconsidered.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971): Held Miranda doesn't preclude Miranda-defective statements from being presented to impeach a witness in front of a jury.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978),: Held If a confession is truly involuntary, and not just Miranda-defective, it cannot be admitted at all, even for impeachment purposes.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976): Held After Miranda warnings are given, Due Process prohibits silence from being used against the accused, even for impeachment.
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980): Jenkins stabbed and killed Redding, and didn't turn himself in until two weeks later. The prosecution tried to use Jenkins' waiting to impeach claims of self-defense. Held Impeachment by use of pre-arrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982): Held Post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used for impeachment in court.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974): Tucker was arrested for rape, was given a faulty Miranda warning, and told the police about Henderson, who had been with him when the crime was committed. The police went to Henderson, who gave them information that incriminated Tucker. Held Because Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards and not themselves Constitutional rights, not giving Tucker Miranda warnings doesn't preclude information obtained lawfully from Henderson. If Tucker's confession had not been voluntary though, Henderson's testimony could not be introduced as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977): An officer called Mathiason on the phone and said he wanted to talk to him somewhere. Mathiason had no preference as to the location, so the officer suggested the police station. The officer said Mathiason was not under a rest, and during a discussion in a closed room Mathiason confessed and was allowed to leave. Held Mathiason voluntarily came to the station and was not in custody of police, so no Miranda warnings were required.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994): An officer interviewd Stansbury, thinking another person was the prime suspect, but after a few questions it became obvious that Stansbury was guilty and so the officer read him the Miranda rights. Held The pre-Miranda statements while in custody must be excluded, regardless of the officer's state of mind.
Rhode Island v. Innis, Supreme Court of the United States, 1980, 446 U.S. 291.: Innis was identified as having shot a cab driver, and he was arrested and read his Miranda rights twice. He asked for an attorney, and was placed in a police car "caged wagon" to be driven to the station. On the way, two officers remarked to each other that they hoped they would find the murder weapon before some little girl at the school for the handicapped found it and accidentally kill themselves. Innis told them to turn around, waived his Miranda rights, and led them to the weapon. Was Innis interrogated as defined by Miranda? Held Stewart: No. Miranda requires some coersion beyond custody, either explicit questioning or police officer words or actions that the officers should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Here the officers did not explicitly ask questions to the prisoner, and they had no idea the prisoner had a conscience that would make him incriminate himself based upon their conversation. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: The majority's reasoning is certainly correct, but how can one say the officer should not have known that their conversation was playing on the prisoner's emotions? Held Stevens: The rule should be that interrogation occurs when any average listener would recognize that a response is called for, not when the officer should have known.
Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987): Mr. Mauro was arrested for killing his son, and he admitted it. He was read his Miranda rights twice and he requested a lawyer. Mrs. Mauro asked to speak with him, and the police required that they listen and placed a tape recorder in plain view. Mr. Mauro indicated that his wife tried to stop him, and this was later used to rebut an insanity defense. Held Powell: There was no evidence officers sent Mrs. Mauro in to elicit a statement. Officers do not interrogate simply by hoping a suspect will incriminate him/herself.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986): Held To constitute a waiver of Miranda rights, 1) the relinquishment must be a free and deliberate choice, and 2) the waiver must be with full awareness of the nature and consequences of the right.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981): Held If the accused asks for counsel, there can be no waiver of that right until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates conversation.
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983): Accused asked for an attorney, but while being transported he asked, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" The police officer noted that Bradshaw had requested an attorney. During the conversation, Bradshaw confessed. Held Rehnquist: There was no vilation of Miranda rights, as Bradshaw initiated the conversation. There is a two-part test for initiation a conversation after requesting the attorney: 1) there must be initiation, and 2) there must be a totality of circumstances indicating knowledge and voluntary waiver.
Brewer v. Williams, Supreme Court of the United States, 1977, 430 U.S. 387: Williams, who had a history of mental problems, was suspected in the abduction of a 10-year-old girl from Des Moines. He called attorney McKnight in Des Moines and then turned himself in to the police in Davenport. Williams was read the Miranda rights several times. His attorney, along with an attorney named Kelly in Davenport, made a deal with police not to question Williams when they drove him from Davenport back to Des Moines. On the road, Detective Learning started talking and told Williams not to answer, just to think about what he said. He talked about how it was right after Christmas, how it was snowing, and how they would like to find the girl's body to give her a Christian burial. Williams led them to the body. Did Williams waive his right to an attorney? Held Stewart: No. Williams turned himself in only talking to an attorney, his attorneys made a deal for no questioning, Williams on the road expressed that he would talk after reaching his attorney in Des Moines. It's evident that Detective Learning deliberately set out to get information. Concur Marshall, Powell, Stevens. Dissent Burger: This was a horrible crime. Williams was read the Miranda rights five times, and knew of his right to keep silent. Surely he knew that leading the police to the body would have serious consequences. Dissent White, Blackmun, Rehnquist: Williams waived his right when he knew he had the right. Dissent Blackmun, White, Rehnquist: The drive was necessary, not just an attempt to isolate Williams from his attorneys, and the questioning wasn't just for incriminating information, it was to find the body.
Bey v. Morton, 124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997): Bey was on death row and talking to Officer Pearson, a corrections officer. They talk about all sorts of subjects, and then Bey admitted to the murders for which he was on death row. Officer Pearson told no one for five years. Was Bey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated? Held No. The officer wasn't trying to elicit information. 1) Pearson had no responsibility for eliciting and reporting the information. 2) Pearson didn't behave like someone trying to get incriminating information.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980): Henry was charged with a crime and deliberately placed in a jail cell with Nichols, a paid government informant who was told not to elicit information but to listen to what Henry said. Held Burger: Henry's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated, because placing in him in a cell with Nichols was to confine him and get information from him, and Nichols made an effort to get information. Concur Powell: Nichols was functionally an interrogator.
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986): Lee was placed in a cell near the defendant and was told not to aske questions but to "keep his ears open." The defendant, without prompting, confessed of the robbery and murder. The informant asked no questions other than saying once that defendant's first version of the events "didn't sound too good." Held Powell: There was no Sixth Amendment violation because here, in contrast to Henry, the informant didn't stimulate the conversation.
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988): Patterson received the Miranda warnings and then signed a waiver of his right to have counsel present. Patterson then said that, while he signed the waiver voluntarily, he did not do so informedly. Held White: The waiver was valid, as the Miranda warnings provide ample information that one has the right to an attorney, that one will be appointed if needed, and that the purpose of the attorney is to advise the defendant against self-incrimination.
United States v. Wade, Supreme Court of the United States, 1967, 388 U.S. 218: A bank was robbed by a man with strips of tape on his face. Wade was indicted, assigned counsel, and without his lawyer's knowledge was put in a lineup with other prisoners, all with pieces of tape on their faces. A witness picked Wade, and the witness at court identified Wade again. Was the lineup a critical stage in the criminal proceedings that required counsel to be present under the Sixth Amendment? Held Yes. Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, etc., which are well established scientifically and have set standards and regulations, a lineup is subject to variations in procedure and the witness' potentially faulty memory. The accused does not have the ability to contest the process, and may not be able to reconstruct any improprieties later. Once a witness determines the accused is guilty, this usually solidifies the identification for the courtroom. Should there be a per se rule that, if a lineup occurred without an attorney present, the courtroom identification should be excluded? Held No, the goverment should be allowed to show that the courtroom identification arose from facts independent enough to purge it from its orginal taint. Factors include prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the identification by a photograph prior to a lineup, and the length of time between the alleged act and the identification. Concur Clark: Since identification occurs during the lineup, it must be a critical stage of the prosecution. Dissent White, Harlan, Stewart: The court shouldn't create such a broad rule that exludes all pre-trial identifications without counsel present, because this ignores significant differences, such as between witnesses that have never seen the suspect and those that have lived with the suspect, for instance.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967): Gilbert was indicted for robbing a bank and murdering a police officer who entered the bank during the robbery. Gilbert was subjected to a lineup without counsel, with around 100 witnesses in the audience, and the witnesses were allowed to confer. Held Brennan: A per se rule of excluding court identification is the only way to effectively sanction lineups that do not have counsel present.
Kirby v. Illinois, Supreme Court of the United States, 1972, 406 U.S. 682: A defendant was arrested for robbery and identified in a lineup without counsel prior to being indicted. Held Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist: In-court identification should not be excluded if the suspect was identified in a lineup without counsel prior to being charged. Routine police investigation differs from circumstances after criminal proceedings have taken place, because in the latter case the prosecution has solidified and the prosecution and the accused become adversaries. (If there is abuse in the lineup, it can still be contested through Due Process of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.) Dissent Brennan, Douglas, Marshall: The initiation of formal judicial criminal proceedings is irrelevant to whether the suspect's rights should be protected. The decisions in Wade and Gilbert didn't turn on criminal proceedings being initiated, and to hold that per se exclusion should occur for any lineup without counsel present wouldn't extend those cases—it would be perfectly in line with them.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973): Held Blackmun: There is no right to the presence of counsel for a photographic identification at any stage of the proceedings, because the accused is not even present. Photographs are less suggestive than a lineup, and can be reconstructed at trial.
United States v. Barker, 988 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.1993): Held A photograph of a lineup doesn't require consel to be present.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967): A man stabbed another Mr. Behrendt to death, and when his wife came in the kitchen and jumped on the assailant, the man stabbed her 11 times. While she was in the hospital for surgery to save her life, the police, from a shirt and keys found on the floor, located an African-American man whom they brought to the hospital, chained to a police officer. Mrs. Behrendt said he "was the man." The suspect was the only African-American male present. Held Brennan: Wade and Gilbert cannot be retroactively applied. Held There was no due process violation, because in the totality of the circumstances it was necessary, in case Mrs. Behrendt died, to bring the suspect in so that he could be identified or exhonerated.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972): Biggers was identified in a one-person lineup because the police said they couldn't find anyone else similar to his peculiar physical appearance. Held This was not an excuse for conducting a suggesting identification procedure. The police should have tried harder to find someone similar.
United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726 (2d Cir.1994): Held Presentation of a suspect immediately after arrest to a confidential informant is not unnecessarily suggestive and is needed to prevent the arrest of innocent persons.
Manson v. Brathwaite, Supreme Court of the United States, 1977, 432 U.S. 98: Glover, a police officer, and Brown, an informant, went to defendant's apartment to buy drugs. There was plenty of light, and Glover stood at the door a few inches from the dealer's face for several minutes. Back at the police station, Glover gave a detailed description of the man. Another police officer brought a photograph of someone to Glover, who identified it as the person he saw at the apartment. Eight months later, Glover identified the man in the photograph as definitely the person who sold him drugs. Should there be a per se rule that evidence from suggestive identification techniques always be excluded, or should there be a totality of the circumstances rule that centers on the reliability of the identification? Held Blackmun: "Reliability is the linchpin." Focusing on reliability is more appropriate because 1) the per se rule goes too far by categorically denying all evidence, 2) reliability-based standards still deter police, and 3) reliability-based standards better serve judicial purposes by not exlcluding reliable evidence. Held This identification was reliable, because 1) Glover had the opportunity to view the suspect, 2) the obvservation was attentive, 3) his description was accurate, 4) Glover was absolutely certain about the identification, and 5) Glover made the identification within minutes after the viewing. Concur Stevens: This was the right result, but really the legislature should be making these rules. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: The majority ignores that the per se rule is a much stronger deterrant, and overemphasize its removal of evidence from use by the prosecution, as much such evidence can be reproduced. Even with a reliability-based totality of the circumstances rule, Glover probably only saw the man's face for a few seconds while the man went away and returned, and during that time Glover was probably not looking at his face the whole time. Glover's identification occurred two days [?] after the crime, and the description was of general features. Glover's ability to identify was weak, and the methods used were suggestive and conducive to error.
United States v. Armstrong, Supreme Court of the United States, 1996, 517 U.S. 456: Defendant, who is black, was arrested for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack. Defendant submitted evidence that all 846 similar cases during 1991 were against black defendants, and tried to discover police records of all cases and defendants' races of similar cases from the last three years. When does selective prosecution violate the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment? Held Rehnquist: When the decision to prosecute is based upon race, religion, or some other arbitrary standard. Must discovery of selective prosecution-based information always be compelled? Held No, because this does not address the merits of the charge—it raises an independent assertion that the charge itself was brought for improper reasons. What standard determines whether discovery must be compelled relating to selective prosecution based upon race? Held The defendant must show that there were other cases with defendants of another race in which charges were not brought. Dissent Stevens: There needs to be "judicial vigilance" over certain types of prosecutions. There is a large disparity in federal punishments between crack and powder cocaine, when state punishments usually don't distinguish between the two. There is also a disparity between federal prosecutions of blacks and whites.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974): Perry, a prisoner, was charged with a misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon. After appealing and receiving the right to a trial de novo, the prosecutor charged Perry with a felonious intent to kill. Held When the prosecutor brings a higher charge after an appeal has been granted, there is a presumption of vindictiveness because the prosecution has the power in doing so to stifle appeals. This presumption will not occur if there is some reason the greater charge could not have originall been brought.
United States v. Goodwin, 454 U.S. 1138 (1982): Defendant was stopped for speeding and, as a result of the incident, charged with misdemeanor assault. After asking for a jury trial, the prosecutor brought a charge of federal assault. Held Stevens: There should not be a presumption of vindictiveness for pre-trial charges, because pre-trial is all about discovery and case development.
United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.1991): Held There is no presumption of vindictiveness if there is a mistrial, because this doesn't require a retrial of issues that have already been decided.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884): Held The right to a grand jury indictment is not incorporated in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885): Held A crime is only "infamous" as far as requiring a grand jury if the punishment can include hard labor or imprisonment in a penitentiary.
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984): Held Burger: Discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreperson does not necessitate a reversal of a conviction as long as there was no discrimination in the selection of the actual grand jury members, as the role of the person is only procedural.
Costello v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 1956, 350 U.S. 359: Costello was indicted for failing to report all of his income for taxes, and it came to light that only three officers who had no first-hand knowledge had testified before the grand jury. Costello asked to quash the indictment because only hearsay evidence had been presented to the grand jury. Held Black: Due Process does not require that all evidence presented to a grand jury meet strict evidentiary rules, as this would delay grand jury proceedings, result in essentially a mini-trial before the trial, and is not needed to ensure that the trial itself is fair. Concur Burton: This decision is correct in that the court should not have to review a grand jury hearing to ensure its indictment is valid, but if it is shown that the indictment was not based upon substantial evidence the indictment should be quashed.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974): Held Illegally seized evidence may be used in a grand jury hearing.
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992): Held Scalia: Prosecutors are not required to present substantial exculpatory evidence they might have to a grand jury. To require this would be to reshape the grand jury, turning it into a trial body rather than an accusatory one, and to do so would be outside the permissible domain of the courts.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994): Albright was arrested and a preliminary hearing, on the basis of dubious testimony, found probable cause to bind Albright for trial although the charges were later dismissed. Held While the Fourth Amendment protects from arrest without probable cause, there is no such substantive due process right that a pretrial hearing weigh evidence according to any particular standard. There is no requirement that a neutral decisionmaker find probable cause before trial.
Powell v. Alabama, Supreme Court of the United States, 1932, 287 U.S. 45: A group of seven illiterate black boys, one of which was 19 years old, were on a train. Somehow there was a fight between them and seven white boys, and the black boys threw six of the white boys off the train. Two white girls claimed to have been raped by six of the black boys, and identified this seven as being present. They were arrested and placed under guard in Scottsboro, a town that seemed ready to mob them, and given counsel only for arraignment, although it was assumed that the counsel would continue to help out. The jury gave death sentences to them all. Held Sutherland: Under these circumstances, the defendants were not given the right to counsel in any substantial sense. Held The Alabama supreme court ruled that the state constitution requirement that the state provide counsel when defendant cannot afford one was not violated, and the Supreme Court cannot change that decision. Held To uphold the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of due process, in a capital case, if the defendant cannot afford an attorney and "is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like," the court must assign counsel even if not requested by the defendant.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942): A 43-year-old man of "ordinary intelligence" was convicted of robbery without counsel. Held The Fourteenth Amendment doesn't require the appointment of counsel here—Due Process requires counsel to be appointed only in "special circumstances."
Gideon v. Wainwright, Supreme Court of the United States, 1963, 372 U.S. 335: Gideon was charged with breaking into a poolroom in Florida with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, but he could not afford a lawyer. Held Black: Any person brought to court who cannot afford a lawyer cannot have a fair trial without having an attorney. The nature of the American adversarial judicial process requires for fairness that a defendant have counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, Supreme Court of the United States, 1972, 407 U.S. 25: Indigent petitioner was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in Florida. Held Douglas: No person may be imprisoned, even for misdemeanors, unless the defendant was represented by counsel at trial or the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver. Trial issues and guilty pleas are often just as complicated for misdeamors as for felonies.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979): Held Rehnquist: Counsel is only required if the defendant is subject to actual imprisonment, not just for crimes for which imprisonment or fines can be imposed. Dissent Brennan, Marshall, Stevens: Counsel should be provided for all crimes that have the possibility of imprisonment, as Argersinger allowed. Otherwise the judge will be forced to decide sentencing options at the start of a trial, before any evidence is heard, in determining whether counsel must be provided
Alabama v. Shelton, Supreme Court of the United States, 2002, 122 S.Ct. 1764: Defendant Shelton was convicted of third-degree assault and sentenced to jail time, but he was put on probation and given fines. Is the conviction was just, even though Shelton was not provided an attorney, because imprisonment was not actually enforced and could not be enforced as required by Argersinger? Held Ginsburg: No, a sentence of imprisonment requires counsel even if suspended. Claiming that resuming the sentence later would derive from a post-trial wrong of violating probation overlooks how the probation got there in the first place. Even if a lawyer is provided upon the suspension of the sentence, the punishment is still based upon the first conviction for which an attorney was not provided. (A more economical situation would be to use pre-trial probation, the violation of which would trigger a full trial with counsel to determine whether imprisonment is proper.) Dissent Scalia, Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas: Shelton has not yet been deprived of liberty. If Alabama wants to effectively have a full-scale trial if and when when they suspend probation, let them.
Faretta v. California, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975, 422 U.S. 806: Faretta was charged with grand theft. Faretta, who had represented himself in a court case in high school, asked to represent himself in this case. The judge allowed it on the condition that he could later revoke it, and later when the judge found that Faretta didn't know hearsay and jury voir dire rules very well he appointed counsel, saying that Faretta did not make a "knowing and intelligent" waiver. Held Stewart: Faretta must be allowed to represent himself. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution talks of the "assistance" of counsel, and talks about the defendant being updated, not the counsel. Faretta clearly and unequivocally declared that he did not want counsel, and the fact that he didn't know certain rules didn't take away from that fact. Dissent Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist: The court has found a new right hidden in the language of the Sixth Amendment but have failed to analyze the practical consequences to the court system of that new right.
United States v. Salerno, Supreme Court of the United States, 1987, 481 U.S. 739: Salerno and Cafaro were arrested on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charges of being leaders of the Genovese Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra. The government urged that defendants be detained under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 because, as the defendants were accused of running a crime enterprise through violent means, they posed a danger to the community or to any person. Does the Act violate due process by imposing a punishment before trial? Held Rehnquist: No, the purpose of the detention is regulatory, not punitive. The government can balance its pressing interests with those of the liberty of the individual. The Act helps this balance by requiring testimony and clear and convincing evidence. Does the Act violate the Eighth Amendment requirement against excessive bail? Held No, the purpose of the Act is not just to permit flight but also to protect the community, so it is not an excessive flight-prevention mechanism. Is the Act unconstitutional on its face? Held No, there is no evidence that it could not be applied to correctly balance state interests and individual liberty interests. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: If a defendant is acquitted, the government cannot continue to hold the defendant solely because it believes the defendant to be dangerous. Isn't the defendant just as presumed innocent before the trial as afterwards? Cafaro was deemed dangerous until the government decided to use him as a covert agent. People around the world are imprisoned indefinitely simply because their governments classify them as dangerous.
United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir.1993): Held To determine of a detention violates due process, the court must balance "(i) the length of the; detention; (ii) the extent of the prosecution's responsibility for the delay of the trial; and (iii) the strength of the evidence upon which the detention was based."
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992): Foucha was acquitted of a violent crime by reason of insanity, but the mental institution in which he was placed claimed he was not and probably never was insane. Louisiana law would not allow him to be released unless he posed no danger, and hospital officials would not certify him as not being dangerous because of his "anti-social" personality. Held The Louisiana law, unlike the Act in Salerno, doesn't require the state to prove anything and allows indefinite detention.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997): Hendricks, who was convicted of child molestation and admitted that when he was "stressed out" he could not "control the urge" to molest children, was placed in preventative detention under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Held Thomas: The Kansas Act does not violate due process because it requires a previous conviction of a sexually violent offense and requires a finding of dangerousness along with mental abnormality. (Dangerous in itself would not suffice.)
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001): 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) provides for detention of certain aliens ordered removed, including inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and aliens at risk to the community, if those aliens cannot be removed within 90 days of the deportation order. Held Stevens: This statute would be conconstitutional because it results from civil issues, not criminal. The goal of preventing flight is dubious as these aliens cannot be deported, and preventative detention based upon dangerousness is limited only to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections. The only thing that saves the statute is its allowance for a habeas corpus action to challenge the detention as unreasonable.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83: Brady and Boblit were charged with the capital offense of first degree murder. Brady's lawyer asked the prosecutor to see Boblit's statements, but the prosecutor withheld Boblit's admission of the killing. Brady admitted compliance but claimed Boblit did the killing. Held Brady gets to be resentenced because the prosecutor withheld "evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty ..."
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995): Kyles was convicted of murdering a woman during a robbery, but Kyles said he was framed by Beanie, an informant. The prosecutor withheld inconsistent eyewitness statements, inconstistent statements by Beanie, and police reports indicating Kyles car was not among the list of cars as expected according to the prosecutor's theory. Held Souter: The withheld information was material under Brady-Agurs-Bagley, and thus affords a new trial. 1) The information gave a "reasonable probability" of a different result, had it been included. 2) The defendant doesn't need to show that, with the information, there would not have been sufficient evidence to convict. 3) After finding constitutional error, there is no need to do determine whether it is harmless. 4) Supressed evidence should be considered collectively, not item-by-item. Dissent Scalia: Brady-Agurs-Bagley applies, but there is no way the withheld evidence could have made the jury believe that four witnesses mistakenly misidentified the same person, which just happened to be the same person that Beanie was trying to frame.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978): Hayes was indicted for "uttering a forged instrument" of $88.30, which usually gets 2-10 years imprisonment. The prosecutor said that if Hayes didn't plead guilty they would indict him under the new Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, which carries a mandatory life sentence. He didn't, they did, and he got it. Held This sort of plea bargaining is allowed, as the prosecutor could always have indicted Hayes under the Habitual Criminal Act.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969): Held Defendant allowed to re-plea because, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, the prosecutor did not ask the defendant whether he understood the nature of the charges and did not make sure the plea was voluntary.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969): A 27-year-old black male was sentenced to death after pleading guilty to five indictments of common-law robbery. Held The guilty plea cannot be accepted because there was no showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary. The constitutional right against self-incrimination cannot be waived by silence.
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976): A 19-year-old with below average intelligence pleaded guilty for second-degree murder for killing a woman he was working for when she discovered him in her room. No one told the defendant that intent to cause death was an element of the crime. Held A guilty plea is invalid if the defendant is not informed of an essential element of the crime, even if the defense attorney would still have recommended the guilty plea and even if the plea would have remained the same.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970): Alford was indicted for the capital crime of first-degree murder. He pled guilty, but then took the stand and said he only pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. Held A plea of guilty may be accepted even if the defendant maintains his/her innocence, as long as there is a factual basis for the plea.
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967): Held The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is binding upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969): Held The right to a speedy trial extends to those who are already imprisoned for other offenses.
United States v. Marion, Supreme Court of the United States, 1971, 404 U.S. 307: Defendants had owned a business selling home improvements such as alarms, and were accused of fraudulent busines practices. They were subject to an FTC cease and desist order in 1967, investigated by a newspaper in 1967, investigated by the DA in 1967-1968, indicted by a grand jury in 1969, and handed the indictment in 1970. Were the defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to Due Process and a speedy trial, respectively, violated? Held White: No. The right to a speedy trial does not go into effect until the start of criminal proceedings by some public accusation such as an indictment, information, or arrest. Other checks are in place to prevent delayed indictments, such as statutes of limitations. (This appeal based on potential prejudice doesn't prevent evidence of actual prejudice, which violated Due Process, from being shown.) Concur Douglass, Brennan, Marshall: Some reasons against delay, such as undue anxiety and ability to gather of evidence, are present even before indictment.
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982): Defendant was charged with murdering his wife and children. Charges were dismissed without prejudice, but four years later a grand jury indicted the defendant for murder. Held Burger: The time between a dropped charge and a later indictment does not count towards a speedy trial determination because the guarantee of a speedy trial is meant to "minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial". Here the citizen's liberty was not constrained.
United States v. Lovasco, Supreme Court of the United States, 1977, 431 U.S. 783: In 1975 defendant was charged with possessing firearms stolen from the mail and with dealing in firearms without a license, the offenses alleged to have occurred in 1973. The defendant had admitted to possessing the firearms, but the prosecutor delayed charged because it could not be determined whether the defendant knew the firearms were stolen. By the time charges were filed, two witnesses, one the supposed source of the firearms and the other defendant's brother who had been present during the exchange, had died. Held Marshall: Delay in prosecution because of bad judgment does not automatically violate due process. Held Investigatory delay before prosecution does not deprive a person of due process, even if it somewhat prejudices the defense's case. 1) Requiring charges to be brought immediately upon probable cause would mean cases might be brought before a finding of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, which is bad for the prosecution because the case isn't as strong and bad for the defendant because some cases would be brought unnecessarily. 2) Requiring charges to be brought immediately upon finding evidence beyond a reasonable doubt would cause some of the same problems, forcing cases that have multiple charges to bring the case before other charges have been fully investigated, and after investigating other factors, such as the "culpability" versus "legal guilt" of the defendant, the prosecution might have decided not to bring the case at all.
United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir.1996): Held Rather than a balancing test for due process violation from pre-indictment delay, the delay must cause "actual, substantial prejudice" and have been intentionally taken by the government to gain a tactical advantage.
Barker v. Wingo, Supreme Court of the United States, 1972, 407 U.S. 514: Manning and Barker were accused of beating an elderly couple to death. The prosecution tried Manning first so they could then use Manning's testimony. Manning went through five trials (hung juries, appeals, etc.) before he was convicted. The prosecution obtained 16 continuances for Barker's trial. Barker was eventually released on bail, and didn't request an immediate trial but asked that the case be dismissed some five years later before it actually went to trial. Held Powell: Barker's not asking for a speedy trial does not constitute a waiver. A balancing test should be used 1) the length of delay (the triggering factor for the others), 2) the reason for the delay, 3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and 4) the prejudice to the defendant, which can include a) oppressive pretrial incarceration, b) anxiety and concern, and c) impairment of the defense. Here there is every indication that Barker wanted the delay, hoping Manning would be acquitted. Barker didn't ask for a speedy trial, and there wasn't much prejudice, which balances the long delay, which was too long and for the wrong reasons. Concur Brennan, White: If a defendant, unlike Barker, wants a speedy trial, that defendant should get it.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992): Doggett was not aware that he had been indicted eight years earlier on federal drug charges when a Marshall's Service ran a lookup on outstanding warrants and found him. Held Doggett's right to a speed trial was violated, and the case must be dismissed. To even trigger a Barker analysis, the defendant must show that the length of time was presumptively prejudicial (usually a year in the lower courts). After a certain point, delay prejudices the case even if it's not obvious how the case is prejudiced. Doggett did not acquiesce, as he didn't even know of the indictment. Government bad faith will be weighed heavily, but official negligence falls in the middle ground between diligent prosecution and bad-faith delay. The length of time here more than outweighs the other factors.
Duncan v. Louisiana, Supreme Court of the United States, 1968, 391 U.S. 145: Defendant, a 19-year-old black male, was driving by and saw his cousins talking to white boys. He stopped and tried to get his cousins to stop the argument and get in the car. As he got it he car to drive away, he touched the elbow of one of the white boys. He was charged with simple battery and the judge sentenced him to 60 days in prison and fined him $150. Held The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is so essential that it is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. (This will not create a presumption that all non-jury trials, even those for which the right to a jury trial has been waived, are unfair.) One has the right to a jury trial in all state criminal cases that would have the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial were they held in federal court. This is for non-petty offenses—offenses with authorized sentenses of somewhere over six months in prison or over $500 in fines. Here the possible sentence was two years in prison, which makes it a serious crime. Dissent Harlan, Stewart: Sure, jury trials are great, but that doesn't mean Louisiana has to use one for a simple battery charge.
Taylor v. Louisiana, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975, 419 U.S. 522: Louisiana didn't allow women to be on a jury unless they specifically filed a written declaration of a desire to be on jury duty. Held White: The Louisiana practice systematically prevents women from being on a jury, even when women make up 53% of the community. Held The requirement of a fair cross-section of the jury pool is essential to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Held Women as a group are sufficiently distinct from men as a group that they cannot be excluded without damaging the fair cross-section of the jury pool. Held If it's a special hardship for a woman to serve on a jury, she can be granted an exception, just as anyone else can, but that doesn't mean that all women categorically have special hardships and should be denied from juries.
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979): Held To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show 1) the group excluded is a significant group within the community, 2) the representation of the group within the jury venire is not fair and reasonable in relationship to the community, and 3) the underrepresentation is a result of a systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. The burden then shifts to the state to show a significant state interest.
Ristaino v. Ross, Supreme Court of the United States, 1976, 424 U.S. 589: A black man was charged with a violent crime against a white security guard. Held The judge here does not have to grant defendant's motion for voire dire on racial prejudice, even though the court encourages it when requested. Whether a judge must grant a defendant's motion for voir dire on racial prejudice depends on the circumstances. The judge in Ham was required to do so because of the defendant's prominence in the civil rights movement and allegation of police framing because of race. Here the defendant hasn't brought forward any reasons for why such voire dire must be had beyond the difference in race between the victim and the accused. Dissent Marshall, Brennan: The majority holding means the the promises in Ham will not be fulfilled.
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968): A statute allowed jurors to be dismissed because they had problems with the death penalty. Held A person may not be sentenced to death if any jurors who had general problems with the death penalty, but were not categorically against it.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961): Six murders were committed in Evansville, Indiana. Press reports were issued indicating the accused had confessed, and the trial was moved to an adjoining rural community. There the newspapers were filled with cartoons, stories of confessions, history of the accused, reports of lie-detector tests, etc. Held The conviction must be struck down. With today's communications, it's unreasonable to expect that there be no preconceived notion as to guilt or innocence, but the jurors here showed a "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice".
Chandler v. Florida, Supreme Court of the United States, 1981, 449 U.S. 560: The Florida Supreme Court had a pilot program testing electronic media in the courtroom, and out of that program came guidelines permitting courts to allow video and photo coverage of trials. This case had unique features that made it prominent in the local news, and the judge allowed broadcasts over the objections of the accused. Held The guidelines do not prima facie deny due process rights. Estes did not announce a rule against all broadcast coverage, and there cannot be a constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage simply because in some instances due process may be violated. Held The accused had a chance to give reasons for not allowing media, but the defendant gave no reasons beyond general objections that broadcasts would institute bias. Concur Stewart: This is the correct decision, but it means overruling Estes. Concur White: Estes should be overruled.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966): Sheppard, a doctor, was accused of murdering his wife. He claimed an intruder did it. The judge allowed constant media coverage, a press table for reporters behind the bar, broadcasts of the proceedings, etc. Held Clark: The conviction is reversed because the judge's failure to control the media deprived Sheppard of his right to a fair trial through the "carnival atmosphere" that resulted.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979): Held A pretrial hearing is not a "trial" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, and so there is no right to include strangers in a pretrial proceeding.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, Supreme Court of the United States, 1976, 427 U.S. 539: The Henry Kellie family was murdered in a community of about 850, and Erwin Charles Simants was the suspect. The court granted a restrictive order on the press as to any evidence or testimony, to protect the accused from prejudicial coverage. Held Burger: The restrictive order was improper and is reversed. Prior restraint on free speech takes a large weight to overcome—the authors of the Constitution didn't even try to balance free speech rights and Sixth Amendment fair trial rights. To determine whether the gravity of the problem, discounted by its improbability, justifies an invasion of free speech to avoid the problem, one must look at a) the nature and extent of the news coverage, b) the extent to which other measures might be effective, and c) how effective a restraining order would be in protecting the rights of the accused. The trial judge only found that news coverage could be prejudicial. There are other measures, such as a change of venue and sequestering the jury, that could remove prejudice. A restraining order is not going to keep a town of 850 from talking. Concur White: These type of restraining orders might never be justified. Concur Powell. Concur Brennan, Stewart, Marshall: Prior restraints on the freedom of the press is not justified to protect the right to a fair trial.
United States v. Scott, Supreme Court of the United States, 1978, 437 U.S. 82: Scott was charged with a three-part indictment of distributing narcotics. Before and during the trial the defendant three times moved to dismiss two of the accounts because of prejudicial delay. The court dismissed the two counts, but submitted the third to the jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty. The government then attempted to appeal the two dismissals. Can the government appeal a dismissal not on the facts that results from a defendant's motion, even after the trial has commenced? Held Rehnquist: Yes. The new Criminal Appeals Act allows any appeals that do not bring Double Jeopardy. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy clause is to bring finality to a decision and to keep the government, with all its resources, from repeatedly trying someone until they get a guilty verdict. The appeal of a conviction, on any grounds besides insufficiency of the evidence, is allowed. An acquittal may not be followed by an appeal if the acquittal resulted from a jury verdict or a determination by the judge that there was insufficient evidence to convict, because this would result in a new trial on the evidence. Here, if the defendant voluntarily stops proceedings, when the government was ready and willing to continue presenting evidence and before the jury has ruled on the facts, the Double Jeopardy clause does not prevent the dismissal from being appealed and the case retried. The same goes for when a defendant asks for a mistrial, and sometimes when the prosecution asks for a mistrial. Dissent Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens: The majority says that there are different types of acquittals: those on the facts, and all others. However, allowing a retrial after an acquittal because of pretrial delay causes just as much burden on the defendant as if the acquittal had been on the facts.
Burks v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States, 1978, 437 U.S. 1: Burks was tried for robbing a bank with a dangerous weapon and convicted. He had brought experts at trial that said he was insane when committing the crimes, but the trial court rejected a motion for acquittal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there had been insufficient evidence and remanded to the trial court to either enter a directed verdict for acquittal or to order a new trial. Can a new trial be ordered if a Court of Appeals finds there was insufficient evidence to convict? Held Burger: No. The purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to keep from giving the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence it "failed to muster" the first time. If a Court of Appeals determines there was not enough evidence to even give the case to the jury, allowing a retrial would give the prosecution another shot at coming up with evidence. This decision overrules previous decisions holding that by moving for a new trial a defendant waives a right to acquittal for evidentiary in sufficiency. Retrial for trial error, if it is not because of insufficient evidence, is allowed because it says the process was defective and implies nothing about the guilt or innocence of the accused.

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