Criminal Law Cases

Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884)
Dudley (defendant), Stephens (defendant), Brooks, and Parker were all lost at sea with no water and very little food. Defendants killed Parker and ate him. Is it murder to kill someone out of necessity in order to survive? Held Sometimes morality overrides necessity. Preserving one's own life is generally speaking speaking a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
Georgia man asserting that Georgia law prohibiting sodomy is unconstituational. Whether it is constitutional for a state legislature to restrict a person's sexual activity performed in private. Held A state has a right to criminalize actions it thinks are immoral and unacceptable.
United States v. Bergman, 416 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
Examines abstract reasons for punishments and the measure of sentences.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
Held Vague law that outlawed vagrancy was declared unconstitutional, because the normal person couldn't understand it ("fair notice" problem), and because the law could be applied to activities that could also be legal, making the police act on other criteria than the statute ("arbitrary enforcement").
People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 381 (1988)
Plaintiffs tried to dismiss California Penal Code 647(d) as unconstitutional, saying that the words "loiters in or about any toilet open to the public for the purpose of engaging in or solicitating any lewd or lascivioius or unlawful act" were too vague. Is "loiter" too ambiguous? Held No, because it specifically states only when there is an intent of unlawful activity. Is "in or about any toilet open to the public" too ambigious? Held No, because statues don't have to be mathematical formulas; a reasonable person can decipher the meaning. Does 647(d) allow arbitrary enforcement by police officers? Held, No, because normal, legal behavior (just going to the background) is allowed. If the person loitering intends to commit an illegal act, wouldn't the illegal act make this statute unnecessary? Held No, this statute is still needed because an officer might personally know the individual, know his/her past acts, or have received complaints from others. Held The statute on its face is not vague, and if it is claimed that it is being discriminatorally enforced, one can bring a separate action for that.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)
Harmelin was in possession of 672 grams of cocaine. In Michegan, possession of over 650 grams of cocaine has a mandatory term of life in prison with no possibility of parole. Is a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams of cocaine unconstitutional under the "cruel and unusual" clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, even when other severe crimes within and without the state have lower sentences? Held The Michegan statute is not unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment can declare things unconstitutional because of disproportionality. Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter: only narrowly—simply look at "grossly disproportionate" sentence versus the gravity of the crime. This case is not disproportionate. White, Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall: the Eighth Amendment does prohibit disproportionate sentences (first look for gross disproportionality, and then local and external sentences), and this is disproportionate.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
A San Francisco ordinance required permission of the Board of Supervisors for wooden laundries. Wo and 200 other Chinese were denied permission, while the other 80 or so non-Chinese petitioners were granted permission. Was Wo unlawfully imprisoned for breaking the ordinance because the statute was discriminatory on its face and in its application? Held Whether or not the law is fair and impartial on its face, it is being applied unequally, making unjust and illegal discriminations between people in similar cirumstances, denying them justice and violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
Michael M. v. Superior Court (1981)
Plaintiff, a 17.5-year-old male, had sex with a 16.5-year-old female. Section 261.5 of the California Penal Code defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Is there a compelling state interest served by the gender-based discrimination of Section 261.5, therefore making it constitutional? Held Yes; The purpose of the legislation is to prevent teenage pregnancies. Almost all the harmful and identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female, so it is reasonable to single out males in order to raise the severity of the consequences of their actions. Making the statute gender-neutral would make it less likely that females would report violations. Concur This statute is part of a body of others, and there are other statutes that punish females for sex-related crimes. Dissent This isn't about preventing teenage pregnancy. It's about continuing a gender-based stereotype in which the female is depicted as having less control over her decisions and more in need of protection for her chastity. Other jurisdictions have gender-neutral provisions, and there is no evidence that gender-pleurality poses a problem. Gender neutrality actually allows more people to be prosecuted.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
Defendant was a passenger in a car stopped by police. When questioned, the officer noticed scar marks consistent with drug use on his arm. Is a state statute criminalizing addiction to narcotics is constitutional? Held No, it is cruel and unusual punishment. 1) Narcotics is a sickness, a mental or physical illness. Illnessess should not be penalized. One would think it outrageous to punish someone for a mental illness. While incarceration is not in itself cruel and unusual, in light of the "crime" it is similar to jailing someone for the common cold. 2) The statute punishes innocents: it is possible to become addicted to narcotics accidentally, such as through medications or by being born to an addict. 3) The statute doesn't completely address the goal of controlling narcotics, because someone could become addicted outside the state, having never used narcotics within the state.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
Defendant drinks a lot. Defendant was found to be drunk in public in violation of a Texas Penal Code statute outlawing being drunk in public. Held A Texas statute outlawing public intoxication is not unconstitutional, and an alcoholic compulsed by that disease to drink and appear drunk in public is still criminally responsible. Robinson said a status could not be punished, not a condition as was the case here (i.e. being drunk in public). Robinson was about a mens reus; in this case, an actual act was involved. If Robinson were extended to include acts as results of status, then a host of laws would be thrown down. Narcotics addicts could never be punished for possession, for instance. Dissent The alchoholism actually compulses defendant to appear in public intoxicated. If it's not a crime under Robinson to have an addiction, it shouldn't be a crime to display the results of that addiction.
In Re David W., 116 Cal.App.3d 689(1981)
Defendant was 15 years old. His mother called the police because he was being violent, and police found him in his bedroom, handcuffed him, and escorted him to the hospital. At the hospital, Tuinal was found in his boots. Prosecution charges defendant with violating Penal Code 647(f), which outlaws being under the influence of any drug in a public place. Can one can be prosecuted for committing a crime that would not have taken place had not the police taken action? Held No; David was in a private place, his bedroom, and was forcibly removed by the police.
People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359 (1970)
Frey and Heanes pulled over defendant in a car and ordered him out of the automobile. At some point both Heanes and Frey were shot, Frey fatally. Defendant's testimony indicated that he felt a shot in his stomach, and then lost consciousness until arriving at the hospital. Held Where not self-induced, unconsciousness is a complete defense to a charge of criminal homicide.
People v. Heitzman, 9 Cal. 4th 189 (1994)
Penal Code 368(a) imposes felony criminal liability on anyone who causes harm to an elder or permits someone to harm an elder. Robert Heitzman was 67 years old, and lived with his son, Richard Heitzman, Sr., Richard's three sons, and Jerry Heitzman. Jerry was primarily responsible for Robert's care, and Robert eventually died through severe neglect. Robert's daughter Valerie (defendant) regularly stayed at the house and had indications that Robert was being abused. Is Penal Code 368(a) unconstitutionally vague as to who has a duty to prevent others from harming elders? Held The statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it imposes a requirement of abuse prevention on those who have no such duty.
People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444(1969)
Defendant had been drinking with friends and went to the house of an ex-girlfriend. He roughed his way in and, on a neighbor's complaint, three police officers arrived and entered the kitchen, where defendant and others were seated. In attempting to arrest defendant, there was a scuffle in which defendant shot an officer once in both legs using the officer's gun. Should intoxication be considered in determining guilt of the charges of assault with a deadly weapon? Held No; Assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crimes, which doesn't require the formation of some further intent.
People v. Williams, 26 Cal.4th 779 (2001)
Attempt to clear up Hood by investigating the legislative history of assault. Held Because assault is a general intent crime, one is guilty whether or not someone was attempting to actually complete the battery—it only matters that a reasonable person would know that the act would accomplish the result. The argument analyzes (in this order): text, legislative history, precedent, public policy.
People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318 (1978)
Defendant entered Cacciatore's apartment, thinking it was his own, and wore Cacciatore's clothes and cooked his food until Cacciatore came home days later. Defendant only realized he was not Cacciatore after the police arrived. The decision for People v. Wells (1949) included dicta that claims evidence for insanity cannot be admitted during the guilt phase. Defendant had been acquitted on insanity, but was appealing because an insanity acquittal sends one to a mental facility. In the guilt phase of the trial, in determining diminished capacity (the defendant did not have the specific intent), can evidence of insanity (the defendant could not have the intent) should be admitted, even if it might result in an acquittal? Held Yes; Evidence of insanity must be admitted at the guilt phase, and the prosecution must bear the burden of refuting all evidence. Can diminished capacity from a mental disease or a defect be used even if there is no lesser included offense? Held Yes; A defense of diminished capacity resulting from a mental disease or defect extends to all specific intent crimes.
People v. Scott, 146 Cal. App. 3d 823 (1983)
Defendant was at a party at which it appears the punch served contained a mind-altering substance. Two days later defendant started acting irrational and took and attempted to take various people's vehicles, claiming he was from the CIA and the FBI, that he was a secret agent, that he was the President fallen from a plane, and that he needed to use the vehicles to complete his mission. Held Defendant is not guilty by means of mistake of fact according to California Penal Code 28 subdivision Three (formerly subd. Four). Because defendant was involuntarily under the influence of some substance, he actually believed that he was a secret agent and needed to use the vehicles. If he were some such agent on an important mission, use of the vehicles would be legally justified under the doctrine of necessity. Since he believed that fact to be true (that he was indeed a secret agent), he did not have the criminal intent necessary for the crime.
People v. Reyes, 52 Cal. App. 4th 975 (1997)
Defendant, under the voluntary influence of drugs, found stolen goods on a street curb. California abolished the diminished capacity defense in 1982, but provided in Section 22(b) that voluntary intoxication can be introduced to determine whether defendant formed a required intent for a specific intent crime. Held Although receiving stolen goods is a general intent crime, it by definition requires that there be knowledge that the goods are stolen, and defendant's intoxication provides proof that this element was not satisfied and is therefore not guilty.
In re Jorge M., 23 Cal.4th 866 (2000)
A minor was found posessing a seminautomatic rifle in violation of a statute. Held The statute defines a general intent crime, but criteria for general welfare crimes means full mens rea is not needed, just that the perpetrator knew or reasonably should have known of the gun's forbidden characteristics (negligence). A public welfare offense can be determined by:
  • Legislative history and context
  • General provision on mens rea
  • Severity of punishment
  • Seriousness of harm to the public
  • Difficulty of ascertaining facts
  • Difficulty of proving mental state
  • Number of expected prosecutions
People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529 (1964)
Defendant accused of statutory rape believed his companion of several months to be over 18, when in fact she was 17 years and nine months old. Is a reasonable mistake of age a defense for statutory rape? Held Yes; His lack of intent is a defense.
People v. Olsen, 36 Cal.3d 638(1984)
Boy committing lewd conduct against a girl under 14 years old (she was 13y10m) Held does not have a defense of mistake of age. In this case, this is not related to the degree of the crime (such as selling marijuana and selling marijuana to a minor), the punishment is more severe, and the age is much younger.
People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal.3d 143 (1975)
Franklin Mayberry, according to Miss B., assaulted her and forced her to have sex, although Miss B. concedes she at one point "put on an act" to try "to fool" him so she could later escape. Mayberry claims she willingly had sex with him. Held Following Hernandez, a reasonable mistake of fact as to the willingness of Miss B. is a defense, and the defendant only has a burden to raise a reasonable doubt as to the mistake of fact.
People v. Barnes, 42 Cal.3d 284 (1986)
Barnes invited Marsha to his house. She said she would come by to purchase marijuana and then leave. After arriving, she repeatedly indicated she wanted to leave and did not want to have sex, but he continued and claims that his eventual sex act was voluntary on her part—she claims it was not. Held Rape victims do not necessarily have to resist in order to prove rape, especially after recent modifications of section 261 to remove resistance requirements. The jury may reject, as it did, Barnes' claimed mistake of fact of compliance.
People v. Goodin, 136 Cal. 455 (1902)
Defendant dug up a highway in violation of a statute, thinking a new road replaced the old one going through his son's property, and that the statute no longer applied to the old road. Held Ignorace of the applicability could be an excuse.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 255 (1957)
Defendant, convicted of a forgery (a felony), lived in Los Angeles for seven years unaware of a city statute requiring convicted felons to register. Held Under due process, it is unconstitutional to convict defendant as there was no probability of her knowledge, there was no notice given, her behavior was completely passive and unaccompanied by any activity besides being in the city, and she was given no opportunity to comply once made aware of the regulation.
People v. Snyder, 32 Cal.3d 590 (1982)
Snyder had been convicted of sale of marijuana, a felony, but she had served no jail time and her attorney had advised her it was not a felony. Penal Code § 12021 criminalizes possession of a concealable weapon for those who have been convicted of a felony. Held Her mistake as to whether she was a felon is a mistake of law, not of fact, and does not provide a defense. Dissent Her status of a felon is no different than the gun's status as a concealable weapon, lack of knowledge of which would serve as a defense.
People v. Berry, 18 Cal.3d 509 (1976)
Albert Berry married Rachel, who was from Israel, and three days later went to Israel and came back claiming to have fallen in love with another man, Yako. Rachel periodically taunted Berry, giving and then refusing sex, describing her love for Yako, and on one occassion after Rachel started screaming Berry strangled her. Held Defendant was entitled to an instruction of voluntary manslaughter, "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice ... upon a sudden quarrel of heat or passion", as Rachel's "continued provocatory conduct" drove him to "a passion of jealosy, pain, and sexual rage" that would caues an ordinary person to act rashly.
People v. Wu., 286 Cal.Rptr. 868 (1991)
Chinese woman defendant had a son with Chinese man in U.S., and man eventually divorced his wife and married defendant. When defendant learned of man's girlfriend and of the impending death of man's mother (her son's grandmother), she strangled her son and then tried to kill herself, although she doesn't remember actually strangling the son. She claimed to want to go together with her son into the afterlive so that she could devote herself to caring for him there. Held (A defense of unconsciousness instruction should have been given to the jury.) Cultural background can provide evidence for a defense, addressing 1) premeditation and deliberation and 2) malice aforethought and heat of passion, but not 3) specific intent to kill.
People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103 (1991)
Man gets very drunk, repeatedly returns to a bar, and finally comes back with a gun and, during a scuffle with the security guard, kills a patron. According to California legislation, voluntary intoxication can be a defense to the specific intent to kill (which would include malice), but not to express malice by itself. Can diminished actuality negate malice? Held No, the new definition of malice (Section 188) throws out diminished views of duty. Does malice (Section 188) require more than the mere intent to kill? Held No, "deliberate intent" only distinguishes express from implied malice. Does the legislations narrowing the definition of express malice and the scope of voluntary manslaughter create due process problems? Held No, the legislature in 1981 simply equated malice aforethought with intent to unlawfully kill, and mental state can still be used to negate intent.
In Re Christian S., 7 Cal. 4th 768 (1994)
Elliott, a skinhead, chased Christian down the beach, threatened to "get him", and challenged him to fire his weapon. Finally, Christian shot Elliott. Did the California legislature's removal of limited capacity as a defense of murder to remove the required malice aforethought component, and does this also remove the imperfect self-defense defense? Held No. 1) The legislature said nothing of imperfect self-defense. 2) Even though both relate to a mental state, they are separate thoughts, and one can be aware of a duty to act lawfully while still unreasonably believing self-defense is needed.
People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15 (1968)
A San Jose cab driver, after living for eight months with woman and her children, kills her 10-year-old daughter. Woman's son came home from school to locked doors, defendant claimed he had cut himself, body was later found, blood in all rooms, multiple lacerations before and after death. Is there enough evidence of premeditation to get first degree over second degree murder? Held No. First degree murder must have an intent based upon a pre-existing reflection, performed as part of a preconceived plan. This is determined by 1) evidence of what defendant did prior to the killing, 2) the victim's prior relationship with the victim implying a motive, and 3) facts about the nature of the killing that would imply a preconceived design for a reason. At least strong evidence of (1) is needed or evidence of (2) in conjunction with (1) or (3).
People v. Wharton, 53 Cal.3d 522 (1991)
Defendant got mad at Smith, killed her with a hammer, tried to commit suicide by inhaling gas from an oven, lit a fire in the fireplace and held Smith to try to warm her, then finally wrapped the body and placed it in a barrel. Is there enough evidence of premeditation to warrant a conviction of first degree murder? Held Yes. Victim retrieved hammer in preparation for the crime shortly before, suggesting planning. Defendant apparently stole items from the house, suggesting motive. Dissent The hammer being outside the toolbox means nothing—who said it belonged in the toolbox?
People v. Ceja, 4 Cal.4th 1134 (1993)
Defendant, separated from his wife, parks pickup at her house and later appears and talks with her, her brother and wife, and a social worker. In the front yard with her and her child, he shoots her. Is Defendant guilty of first degree murder because of lying in wait according to §189? Held Yes. Parking the pickup and waiting until a social worker was talking with victim was evidence of watching and waiting. He concealed a weapon and lured victim alone to the front yard.
People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981)
Defendant kills because of driving drunk. Is vehicular homicide (§192 subd. 3(a)) an exception to general murder (§§ 187-189)? Held No, an exception under Williamson must have parallel elements and its violation must violate the general rule. Are second-degree murder and vehicular manslaughter coterminous; does the latter exclude the former for unintentional killings? Held No, vehicular manslaughter requires gross negligence, while second-degree murder requires implied malice, which includes a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk and involves an element of wantonness, both absent in gross negligence. Gross negligence is if a reasonable person would have been aware of the risk, implied malice depends on determining the defendant actually was aware. Was the defendant actually aware of the risk? Held That has to be determined by jury, but his drinking, driving, breaking, etc. could make a person of "ordinary caution or prudence" believe as much.
People v. Burden, 72 Cal.App.3d 603 (1977)
Defendant did not feed baby or ensure wife fed baby, and baby died of malnutrition. Defendant was aware the baby was starving. Is defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter or second-degree murder or manslaughter? Held: The jury found that the defendant's omission to provide food for his child was not just "aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless" neglect "incompatible with a proper regard for human life" (involuntary manslaughter), but involved a large probability that it would result in death, constituting a "wanton disregard for human life" (second-degree murder).
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112 (1988)
Walker, Christian Scientist, did not get her four-year-old daughter medical attention when she fell ill. Instead, she brought in Christian Scientist nurses to pray for her, and the child died after 17 days. Does the English common law from the 19th century recognize prayer as a substitute for medicine therefore making her conduct insufficient to constitute criminal negligence? Held: No, Regina v. Wagstaffe (1868) says that whether such an act is negligence must be decided by the jury, and in Regina v. Hines (1874) the medical alternatives to prayer were blisters, leeches, and calomel. Does defendant's sincere belief in the efficacy of prayer remove criminal negligence as a matter of law? Held: Sincere belief does not remove negligene as a matter of law—it's for the jury to decide what a reasonable person would do in the defendant's situation. Does the First Amendment's protection of freedom of religion prevent prosecution? Held: No, the state's interest must be balanced; a parent's right to "become [a] martyr" does not give that parent a right to force an underaged child to do the same. As Penal Code § 270 authorized treatment by prayer, does conviction of manslaughter violate Due Process by giving no fair notice on when lawful prayer treatment becomes lawful? Held No, for an act causing death the defendant must use common experience to determine the degree at which the conduct becomes criminally negligent.
People v. Roberts, 2 Cal.4th 271 (1992)
Defendant prisoner led other prisoners to attack inmate Gardner, who dazed and without reason grabbed a knife from the floor, stumbled up stairs, and reflexively stabbed Officer Patch who tried to stop him. Are defendant's actions the proximate cause of death? Held Only if it is foreseeable that that someone in the victim's state could cause a death. The intervening actor must not be a free moral agent, and the intervening act must occur within a reasonable time period.
People v. Armitage, 194 Cal.App.3d 405 (1987)
Defendant, drunk, took his friend out on a boat and drove negligently. The boat capsized, defendant told his friend to hang on the boat, but the friend instead tried to swim to shore and drowned. Does the reckless decision of the friend keep defendant from being the proximate cause of death? Held The death of the friend is part of the "natural and continuous sequence" of events set in motion by defendant. Contributory negligence by the victim is not a superseding cause. It is foreseeable that, in a panic-ridden state, the victim might make a bad choice that woudl contribute to his death.
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441 (1983)
Defendant gathered some friends and, armed with sticks and rifles, attempted to invade and steal a marijuana crop. Victim was approaching with a shotgun when defendant got scared, pointed his gun, and fired, killing the victim with nine bullets. Is the felony-murder rule still part of California statutes? Held Yes; even through the history of § 189 makes it appear that felony-murder was not carried forward, a reference by the statute defining arson to the felony-murder rule indicates that the legislature thought it was still in force, and therefore intended it to be. Does murder felony violate Due Process because it presumes malice? Held No, because as a matter of law malice is not part of the definition of murder felony. Does a life sentence for killing while committing a felony violate the California constitution of cruel and unusual punishment? Held In this case, yes. Defendant was a young, immature kid who reacted unwisely to a quickly escalating situation. His buddies received proverbial slaps on their wrists. Defendant's punishment is therefore unproportional to the actions.
People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 (1965)
Two men robbed a gasoline station, and then shot the defendant's partner. Is the defendant guilty of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule, even though the killing was not performed by one of the felons? Held No. 1) When the killing is not by the defendant but by the victim, malice aforethought cannot be attributable to the defendant. 2) Murder-felony is parallel to the degree-fixing Section 189, which requires the defendant actually do the killing. 3) The purpose of murder-felony is to deter felons from killing, and applying the murder-felony rule to a killing performed by the victim would not further that purpose. 4) It would impose an extra penalty on the defendant solely based upon others' reations. 5) Murder-felony is not necessary if, for example, the defendant starts a gun-battle, because there would be implied malice. 6) It would lead to absurd results, such as the partner being killed when the defendant was in the custody of police.
People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71 (1961)
Defendant robbed a store and then sped off with the money. About 48 minutes later defendant was pulled over for speeding, at which point he shot and killed the officer. Does defendant's murder fall within the definition of first degree murder in that it was committed during a robbery? Held Yes; a robbery may be spread out over time, and having a gun and meaning to use it is part of the escape plan. Defendant here believed the officer was attempting to arrest him for the robbery, so he shot the policeman in an effort to effect his escape.
People v. Sears, 62 Cal.2d 737 (1965)
Defendant entered the house of his estranged wife and in a struggle with her he lacerated her lip and nose. In the process he killed her daughter by an accidental knife laceration, and attacked her mother. Is defendant guilty of first-degree murder according to the felony murder rule and Penal Code 189, which fixes first degree murder for murder while performing mahem? Held No, there was no specific intent to disfigure, so there was no intent to commit mayhem. Even though cases have allowed a presumed intent for mayhem, using that presumed mayhem intent to be transferred via the felony murder rule to an attempt of murder is to "compound ... fictions".
People v. Patterson, 49 Cal.3d 615 (1981)
Defendant, violating Health and Safety Code section 11352, supplied cocaine to victim, who died. When evaluating the second-degree felony murder doctrine regarding a felony with inherent danger to human life, should only the felony in the abstract be considered? Held Yes; otherwise, the specific events, if causing death, would always be inherently dangerous. Held Only the section of the statute that applies should be analyzed, as the varioius drugs were placed in the same statute merely for convenience. Held "Inherently dangerous to life" means "a high probability that death will occur", which is analogous to implied malice for second-degree murder, which this felony-murder rule substitutes for.
People v. Smith, 35 Cal.3d 798 (1984)
Defendant beat her child, who hit her head and died. Does the child abuse, a felony, serve as the underlying felony to support second-degree murder felony? Held No; the underlying felony was an "integral part of" and "included in fact" in the homicide, so if the felony murder rule were applied it would essentially remove the malice test from the underlying felony. To apply the murder felony rule, the the underlying felony must be independent of the homicide. (The one exception is if the underlying felony was committed with an "independent felonious purpose.")
People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300 (1994)
Defendant, after unsuccessfully trying to go by drugs with victim's father, came back to house and, thinking no one was home, fire shots at the house and killed a child inside. Willfully and maliciously firing a gun at an inhabited dwelling place is a felony according to Section 246. Is Section 246 "inherently dangerous" according to the definition for second-degree murder felony? Held Yes; shooting at a house is likely to kill someone. Does the underlying felony therefore merge into the homicide and prevent the application of the second-degree murder homicide as in Ireland and Smith? Held No; Ireland only applies to an underlying felony of assault. If every dangerous felony were merged with homicide, that would remove any effect from the second-degree murder felony rule, as the underlying felony has to be dangerous by definition. Precluding underlying felonies that are an "integral part of homicide" would keep the rule from applying to the most dangerous felonies. (The rule also does apply to underlying felonies "committed with a collateral and independent felonious design", because otherwise those who committed dangerous felonies but did not intend injury would be punished more than those intending injury with the collateral and independent felonious design.) The rule must then be that the underlying felony "will not elevate all felonious assaults to murder or otherwise subvert the legislative intent."
People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167 (1956)
Defendant, a pharmacist, prepared a drug for victim baby and used contents from a bottle labeled "sodium citrate" that in reality contained sodium nitrate. Is defendant, having technically violated Section 26280 of the Health and Safety Code of preparing, compounding, and selling and adulterated and misbranded drug, guilty of performing an unlawful act under Section 192 of the Penal Code? Held No; Section 192 is not exempt from Section 20, which requires both an act and an intent, meaning that defendant had to have performed the actions intentionally or through criminal negligence.
People v. Cox, 23 Cal.4th 665 (2000)
Defendant punched in the head a man who had been drinking alcohol and smoking crack cocaine. The man later died from a skull fracture and internal head injuries resulting from hemorrhaging of the blood vessels. Should the assault/battery misdemeanor be inherently dangerous in the abstract or dangerous in its commission for the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule to come into effect? Held A misdemeanor must be dangerous in the circumstances of its commussion to result in misdemeanor-manslaughter—whether it is inherently dangerous or dangerous in the abstract is not dispositive, unlike the second-degree felony-murder rule.
People v. Nieto-Benitez, 4 Cal.4th 91 (1992)
Victim and friend accidentally hit defendant with a plate of food, soiling his shirt. Defendant returned with a firearm and during the ensuing argument took out the firearm, which went off and killed victim. To convict defendant of second-degree murder with implied malice, does the act of brandishing a firearm have to be considered in the abstract to meet the act part of the implied malice rule? Held No, the act in this specific instance should be considered, unlike in the felony murder rule. Since brandishing a firearm is a misdemeanor, does Section 192 mean that defendant can only be charged with manslaughter? Held No, Section 192 doesn't say that all homicides in the commission of a misdemeanor are manslaughter, but only those that are committed without malice.
Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 578 (1970)
Smith and Daniels robbed Mr. and Mrs. West at their liquor store, and Daniels was chattering about "He's got a gun. Don't move or we'll have an execution right here." Mrs. Daniels shot and killed Smith, and shot Daniels. Was Daniel's conduct sufficiently provocative of lethal resistance to imply malice needed for murder? Held Yes; his comments and actions in essence initiated the killing. Rather than felony-murder, this is the doctrine of vicarious liability. Dissent Peters: The majority has made a distinction between simply brandishing a gun during a robbery, which surely has an implicit threat of killing, with actually saying that you will kill someone, and that's a silly distinction. This is really just a way to sneak murder felony in the back door for cases in which a victim kills someone.
Pizano v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 128 (1978)
Defendant and accomplice robbed Mr. Vaca of 13 cents and on leaving his house accomplice used him as a shield. Mr. Cuna next door shot at defendant in order to prevent the robbery, not realizing Vaca was present, and killed Vaca. Does accomplice's taking Vaca as a hostage imply malice to the defendant? Held Yes, this action in addition to the robbery shows malice—in fact, it could be argued that this "direct and immediate danger to the deceased and him alone" is even express malice. Is the killing attributable to an act of the defendant, even though Gilbert seems to require that the shooter's actions be in reasonable response to the crime? Held Yes; Gilbert really means that the defendant has to be the proximate cause of the death, not that the shooter always has to be reasonably responding. Cuna didn't have to know Vaca was there.
In Re Joe R., 27 Cal. 3d 496 (1980)
A minor and Ryles tried to rob a man on a park bench, Anderson. The minor kept telling Anderson to cooperate or Ryles would kill Anderson. They led Anderson behind a building, Anderson grabbed the gun, the minor punched Anderson from behind, Anderson shot Ryles, and the minor ran away. Is the minor guilty of the murder of Ryles because of implied malice? Held No; There must be intentional and malicious acts in addition to the felony itself, and these acts must be the proximate cause of death. The minor's saying "or he kill you" were always conditional, meant only to further the crime. Leading Anderson to a dark place was only prevent observation, not for execution. The small "rabbit punch", as admitted by Anderson, was not enough for him to "notice it", and was therefore not a proximate cause of Ryles' death. Dissent Clark: Anderson might not have shot Ryles if the minor had not come to his aid, so the minor's punching Anderson was the proximate cause of Anderson shooting Ryles, making the minor vicarioiusly responsible for Ryles' death.
People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal.4th 834 (2001) (Supplement)
Defendant gang member had prepared a gun and stood outside a house while rival gang members drove by. A shooting occurred, and an innocent bystander was killed, although it could not be determined who fired the bullet. Can both the defendant and the drive-by shooter be convicted of first-degree murder? Held Yes, because although there is only one actual cause of death, there can be multiple proximate causes of death, similar to the drivers racing down the street. Actions of both show malice.
People v. Brown, 105 Cal. 66 (1894)
A boy stole a bicycle to "get even", intending to return it. Can he be guilty of larceny? Held No, for larceny he must have an intent to "wholly and permanently deprive the owner" of the object.
People v. Davis, 19 Cal. 4th 301 (1998)
A man took clothing off the rack in Mervyn's and carried it to another department and tried to return it. The security officer, who had been watching on video, telephoned the clerk to issue a store credit, after which he apprehended the defendant. Is defendant guilty of larceny, even if he never intended to permanently deprive Mervyn's of the shirt? Held Yes; the right to a refund or credit means the defendant is claiming ownership of the shirt. Such an intent also satisfies the trespass part of the larceny requirement. Besides, the ownership would likely have been permanent had the clerk refused the refund. Therefore lack of intent to deprive of property still holds in the special cases of 1) when defendant intends to sell the property back to the owner, 2) when the defendant seeks an award for the property's return, and 3) when the defendant intends to get a "refund" for the property.
People v. Holmes, 5 Cal. App. 3d 21 (1970) (skipped)
People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal.4th 935 (1999) (Supplement)
Defendant went to ex-wife's house to loan her $200 and then, realizing she intended to give it to her mother, forcibly took the money back from her. Held Defendant is not guilty of robbery because his good faith belief that he owned the money negates the animus furandi (felonious taking) element of robbery. (This claim-of-right defense does not apply to collection of a debt—it only applies here because he took back the specific $200 bills he thought were his.) (The defendant could still be charged with assault.)
People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1 (1980)
Defendant drove his wife to the river, she put her purse in the car, he forced her to take off her clothes and have sex with him, and then he killed her. He took off her ring to hinder identification. If defendant's stealing was incidental to the killing, is he guilty of robbery? Held No; there must be both an act and an intent working together. For larceny in California, the defendant must have intended to steal the property at the time of taking it (although this does not have to be the case for embezzlement or some lesser offenses), and this follows for robbery. Because the defendant derived no value from the property, is the defendant guilty of theft? Held Yes; In California, it is necessary only that the defendant intend to permanently deprive the owner of the property, not that the defendant seek personal gain.
People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246 (1954)
Defendant obtained money from two women with their permission by misrepresenting the worth of a corporation and promising that, for example, a theater would be built on land it later turned out the corporation did not own. Because the nonperformance happened after the exchange, is defendant still guilty of obtaining property under false pretenses—in other words, is a false promise the same as false pretenses? Held Yes; nonconformance can fall under obtaining property under false pretense if a specific criminal intent is proven. To decide otherwise would sanction such scams as this with no benefit to the social order.
People v. Moses, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1245 (1990)
A cow wandered away and later turned up in defendant's pen. Is the defendant guilty of receival of stolen goods in violation of § 496? Held No, receival of stolen goods requires the goods to be stolen, and in this case the cow just wandered off. (Defendant cannot be charged on appeal with misappropriate of found property under § 485 because this charge was not advanced at the trial, and besides, a thief cannot be charged with misappropriation of the same stolen goods unless a separate act is involved.)
People v. Hays, 147 Cal. App. 3d 534 (1983)
Defendant broke through the roof of the Sav-On drug store with a rifle, startling the bookkeeper, who fled the scene before the defendant took money from the safe. Does there have to be proof that the bookkeeper was scared to prove defendant committed robbery? Held No; robbery is simply a larceny by the use of force or fear, and it's evident the defendant used fear. Because the bookkeeper left, can there still be robbery when the bookkeeper was not in the presence of the robbery? Held Yes; the bookkeeper was scared away by the use of fear, and only removed herself to a safe distance, so she was "constructively" present at the crime.
People v. Webster, 54 Cal. 3d 411 (1991)
Defendant and others were living on a riverbank encampment in Sacramento. Needing a car, defendant lured someone near the camp, then lured them on foot to the camp and killed them, taking the key and then driving off in the car with the others. Because the use of force on the victim was away from the car, can defendant still be convicted of robbery? Held Yes; the victim was not too far away to perceive and resist an attempt to seize the vehicle. The act of "taking" begins when the victim is separated from the property, even if peacably by trick, and it continues through the actual force used. Dissent As held in People v. Hayes (1990), "immediate presence" means that the victim exercised some physical control over the property at the time force or fear was employed, and in this case the victim had no physical control and the force was used later than the "luring" away—the majority's reasoning would allow any timespan between luring and force.
People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709 (1975)
Defendant and housemate got into an argument. Defendant borrowed a gun from a neighbor, returned, and shot the housemate in the arm. Can one be guilty of burglary in his/her own dwelling? Held No, the entry must be without consent or possible to be denied, which cannot happen in one's own home. The purpose of the burglary crime is to address the danger caused by unauthorized entry. (The codification of burglary under section 459 expanded the types of buildings that could be entered, eliminated the nighttime requirement, and eliminated the requirement of "breaking".)
People v. Davis, 18 Cal. 4th 712 (1998)
Defendant placed a forged check into the chute of a walk-up window of a bank. Is defendant guilty of burglary? Held No; inserting a forged check (or a stolen credit card as in Ravenscroft) is not as a tool to gain entry and it does not violate the occupant's possessory interest in the building. As in Gauze, burglary laws are to stop situations dangerous to personal safety. Here defendant's actions are similar to mailing a forged check to a bank or sliding a note under a door. (Burglary consists of an act (unlawful entry) and an intent (the underlying larceny or felony). In California if any part of defendant's body enters a building, or if an object enters a building for the purpose of entering or for the purpose of the felony, defendant is guilty of a burglary.)
People v. Sparks, 28 Cal.4th 71 (2002) (supplement)
Defendant show up on victim's doorstep and tried to sell her magazines. She declined and defendant came in for a glass of water. Victim went into a bedroom to get shoes and defendant followed her and raped her. If defendant formed an intent to rape after entering the house but before entering the room in which the rape occurred, has the defendant committed burglary? Held Yes; although some states and the Model Penal Code state that the room must be a separate secure location (such as another dwelling), California Penal Code § 459 appears to intend, from precendent and lack of changing to follow other jurisdictions, that entry into any room will suffice, even if the defendant already entered the house.
People v. Kwok, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (1998)
Defendant, who had known victim for two years, borrowed a door lock and made a key without her permission, so that at a later date he could sneak in and "surprise" her by pretending to be attacking her. Is defendant guilty of burglary if the intended felony when breaking in occurs at a later time? Held Yes; As long as the entrance was performed in order to facilitate a theft or felony, according to § 459 the crime is a burglary, even if the intended action occurs later or at a different location. (Furthermore, making a copy of the key is just like stealing the key itself, as this steals the owner's exclusive right to control access.)
People v. Salemme, 2 Cal. App. 4th 775 (1992)
Defendant entered a house intending to sell fraudulent securities. Is such an entry a burglary, even if the intended crime poses no physical danger? Held All enterings that meet the requirements of § 459 are burglary, even if they pose no physical danger, unless the defendant 1) has an unconditional possessory right to enter as an occupant of the structure, or 2) is invited by the occupant who knows of and endorses the defendant's felonious intent. The real purpose of the burglary crime is to protect a posessory right in property, and the Gauze statement that the purpose is to protect personal safety in defendant's entrance is dictum.
People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43 (1981)
Defendant tied up his estranged wife in a room, closed the door, and, with the daughter sleeping in another room, turn on gas burners and lit a candle. Held To be convicted of second-degree murder of the daughter, it must be proved that defendant had a specific intent to kill. (i.e. One cannot attempt to have implied malice.)
People v. Berger, 131 Cal. App. 2d 127 (1955)
Defendant and Burns discussed with a pregnant woman the instructions for preparing herself for an abortion, then came to the woman's house with surgical equipment, boiled the equipment, and prepared for an abortion. The Penal Code section 274 crime of abortion is the use of a device with the intent to produce miscarriage. Is it possible to attempt an abortion, since an abortion is itself an intent? Held Yes, it is possible to attempt to use a device, having the same intent as the crime. Held The acts of preparing the equipment were not mere preparation but attempt, as they were no longer equivocal. (Similarly, acts closer to the final act are more likely to be attempt rather than preparation.)
People v. Staples, 6 Cal.App.3d 61 (1970)
A self-described humble mathematician decided to rob a bank. He rented a room and over days started drilling through the floor. He later decided he should just have a quiet life with his wife, and stopped. Did the acts go beyond mere preparation to attempt? Held Yes, the actual drilling was but a small distance away from actual burglary. There are two measures for attempt: 1) when the last proximate action is completed yet for some reason the crime does not happen, and 2) when the act goes beyond mere preparation and turns into an unequivocal and direct step toward committing the crime. Does defendant's voluntary ceasing of the attempt make it not an attempt? Held No, once an attempt is made there's no un-attempting a crime.
People v. Adami, 36 Cal.App.3d 452 (1973)
Defendant tried to get an undercover police officer to kill defendant's wife. Defendant is obviously guilty of solicitation, but is he guilty of attempted murder? Held No, his actions were merely preparation. Neither the defendant nor the supposed assassin performed any unequivocal overt acts that could be said to be in the commencement of the commission of the crime.
People v. Gordon, 47 Cal.App.3d 465 (1975)
An attorney discussed with a police officer planting cocaine on someone for the attorney's client—a bribe. They discussed payment. After several phone calls the attorney decided against the whole thing. Held The defendant is guilty of solicitation if he or she at any time asks another to commit a crime with the intent that the crime be committed, even if the request is not in such words, and even if the defendant later changes his or her mind.
People v. Rubin, 96 Cal. App. 3d 968 (1979)
A national director of the Jewish Defense League had a press conference in which he said he would give $500 to anyone who killed, maimed, or seriously injured a Nazi intending to march in Skokie, Illinois. Defendant claims he was simply stimulating action in the defense of the Jewish community. Held Defendant can be charged with solicitation of murder, for the jury to decide whether he intended the crime to actually be committed. Is defendant's speech protected under the First Amendment? Held No, his words were not general advocacy of a crime but actual solicitation, because it was directed at inciting 1) imminent lawless action and 2) was likely to incite or produce such action.
People v. Swain, 12 Cal. 4th 593 (1996)
Defendant's friend fired lethal shots from a van during a drive-by shooting. Can defendant be convicted of conspiring to commit second-degree murder based upon implied malice? Held No; conspiracy to commit murder requires an intent to kill, and if there is an intent to kill there is express malice. [talk about how the alternative would require that the act actually take place.]
People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (1967)
Lauria supplied a call message service, and he knew many of his customers were prostitutes. Held Lauria is not guilty of conspiracy. Conspiracy requires both the knowledge of illegal use of goods and the intent to further that use. Intent can be "established by (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on, (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself." Intent can be inferred from knowledge when either 1) the purveyor of goods has some sort of stake in the venture (through inflated prices, for example); 2) no legitimate use of the goods or services exists; 3) the volume of business is grossly disproporitionate to any legitimate demand, or 4) if the crime is particularly bad, such as some felonies.
Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49 (1950)
Lorenson, a police captain, was known to dislike Pearson, a dislikable person who had secured the title of Mrs. Phillip's house legal proceedings from a dispute over $10. One day several men beat up Pearson, stole a tape on which Pearson had recorded their conversation, and drove away. There was a traffic violation, a car chase, and the men were finally brought to the station. Lorenson called before the men arrived, claiming he had been given a tip that they had been arrested, hinting that it would be too bad if the men were arrested. Lorenson's attorney working for free on Mrs. Phillip's case also called at about the time the crime occurred, saying that if the men were brought in that the booking be delayed until he got there. Another police officer and friend of Lorenson released the men once they were brought in. Is there enough evidence to link Lorenson to a crime of conspiracy? Held Yes; The coincidental activities give more than a mere suspician that Lorenson's acts may have been in furtherance of a common plan to accomplish an unlawful purpose, and a reasonable suspician is all that's needed to bring this to trial. Is §182 (5), conspiracy to obstruct justice, unconstitutionally vague? Held No; the words are relatively certain as used in common law, and are defined in the statute.
People v. Mayers, 110 Cal. App. 3d 809 (1980)
Defendant was convicted of operating three card monte, a card trick that requires at least two people, a dealer and a shill. Penal Code § 332 criminalizes the game of three card monte, while Penal Code § 182, subdivision (4) outlaws a conspiracy to defraud. Does the Williamson rule of narrow/broad statute overlap make § 332 override the conspiracy statute? Held Yes, because the three card monte statute is narrower than the conspiracy statute, yet covers the same crime, so the narrower statute applies as an exception to the broader one. Does the "concert of action rule" (Wharton's Rule) prevent the defendant from being charged for conspiracy? Held Yes; because the elements of the felony conspiracy crime are included in the misdemeanor three card monte crime, the legislature must have intended the misdemeanor to apply, else every three card monte crime would automatically be elevated to a felony.
People v. Rojas, 55 Cal. 2d 252 (1961)
A thief stole a truck loaded with electrical conduit, and the police found it and an undercover policeman drove it to the shop of Rojas, who the next morning started to unload it. Rojas was charged with receiving stolen property. Held Once the police seize stolen property, it loses its "stolen" status and is placed in the trust of the police. Therefore defendant can only be convicted of attempt to recover stolen property. Does the lack of stolen goods relieve defendant from convinction of attempt to receive stolen property? Held No, the act and intent do not rely on there being actual property to receive in the crime of attempt. Was defendant in a conspiracy with the actual thieves, and therefore was guilty when the crime was committed? Held No, if this were true it would mean defendant received stolen goods from himself, which isn't possible.
People v. Peppars, 140 Cal. App. 3d 677 (1983)
Undercover police officer told defendant about a warehouse to which he could get the keys, and defendant got the keys from the officer. Police put supposedly stolen goods in the warehouse and arrested defendant when he and his partner attempted to steal them. If defendant cannot be charged for actually stealing the goods because he entered with the permission of police, can defendant still be charged with conspiracy to steal? Held Yes; like attempt, factual impossibility is no defense for conspiracy, because conspiracy punishes the act of conspiring, not the actual completion of the object crime.
People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451 (1895)
Riley's two horses had wandered away, so he told Hecker he would pay him to find them. Hecker found and returned them, but then Riley decided that Hecker had stolen them in the first place. Hecker wanted to keep the horses in lein of the reward Riley had offered, so, having one horse, went with a pistol to the place where the other horse was. Riley was there with the other horse and when Hecker tried to get it, there was a gun battle. Hecker pursued Riley and shot him. Held There are five considerations for the defense of self-defense to murder: 1) Self-defense is not available if you start a quarrel with the intent to use deadly force. 2) The same goes for those two agree to a deadly combat. 3) If one, not at fault, is placed in a situation in which a reasonable person would think one would get killed, one can kill in self defense, staying or even pursuing if it is deemed safer than retreating. 4) If one makes a felonious assault and the other response, the first must make clear that the first is backing down before self-defense is available. 5) If one makes a less-than-felonious assault, one may use self-defense because the assault did not warrant a deadly response, but one must first decline the strife unless there isn't enough time.
People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th 1073 (1996)
Defendant had been abused as a child, had been in several abusive relationships, and in her current relationship her husband had periodically beat her and threatened her. At one point, a day after he shot at her, she sensed the situation was worsening and shot him. A defense of perfect self-defense requires defendant have an actual and reasonable belief of the need for self-defense, and this is a defense for murder and manslaughter. Imperfect self-defense only shows an actual belief but not a reasonable one, which is a defense for murder but not for manslaughter. Should expert testimony of Battered Women's Syndrome be considered not only for actual belief, but for reasonableness of the belief? Held Yes, because to consider how a reasonable person would act, one must consider the situation from the defendant's point of view, and evidence of the psychology of a battered person is relevant not only for the jury to consider if the defendant had such a belief, but if it was reasonable for someone in that situation to have that belief. (This is not, however, changing "reasonable person" to "reasonable battered woman.")
People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347 (1969)
Lt. Riley had a report of a prowler being a "male Negro, about six feet tall, wearing a white shirt and tan trousers." He stopped defendant, questioned him, then tried to arrest him but defendant resisted. The arrest was without probably cause. Held Penal Code section 834a prohibits forced resistance to lawful or unlawful arrests, because that takes the dispute over the unlawful arrest from the streets to the courtroom and doesn't remove the Fourth Amendment right. Held Penal Code section 243, felony battery of a police officer doing "any duty of his office," does not create a separate crime (i.e. only a misdemeanor assault or battery remains) when the arrest is unlawful because in that case an officer is not doing the "duty of his office." Held Reasonable self-defense is allowed when an arrest uses excessive force, because "a person's right to bodily integrity" cannot be protected by taking it off the street into the courtroom. "To summarize, then, construing sections 834a and 243, it is now the law of California that a person may not use force to resist any arrest, lawful or unlawful, except that he may use reasonable force to defend life and limb against excessive force; but if it should be determined that resistance was not thus justified, the felony provisions of section 243 apply when the arrest is lawful, and if the arrest is determined to be unlawful the defendant may be convicted only of a misdemeanor."
People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal. 3d 470 (1974)
Defendant noticed that someone had tried to enter his garage, so to protect his belongings he rigged a .22 pistol that, while he was gone, shot a 16-year-old boy in the face. Defendant is charged with assault (unlawful attempt, coupled with present ability, to commit violent injury on a person) with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §245). Should the law consider the mechanical device to be just as if the defendant were present, as in tort? Held No, torts rely on happenstance. Mechanical devices do not distinguish between "children, firemen and policemen acting within the scope of their employment" as a real person could, so criminal law doesn't allow that common law exception. If mechanical devices were allowed, would Penal Code section 197(1), justifying homicide to defend a habitation against a felony, justify the defendant? Held No; because of the diversity of felonies available, that statute should be read to only apply to situations that reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm, or in section 197(2), violence or surprise (surprise includes force or violence and is redundant). Does Penal Code section 197(4), which justifies homicide if attempting to apprehend a felon, justify the defendant? HeldNo, from defendant's testimony he wasn't trying apprehend anyone, he was trying to protect his property.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
[Civil Case] Tennessee officer Hymon saw an apparently unarmed burglar suspect climbing over a fence and, when the suspect did not stop when the officer so ordered, Hymon shot the 15-year-old fatally in the head. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982) allowed use of any force necessary to stop those resisting arrest. Held The Tennessee statute is not unconstitutional on its face but is here in its application. Upon balancing "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against government interests, the suspect's interest in life and the government's interest in judicial determination of guilt, which is frustrated by killing a suspect, make it unconstitutional to use deadly force to apprehend an unarmed, nondangerous suspect. Does the common law allowing deadly force for fleeing felons at the time of the Fourth Amendment was written mean the Amendment should be similarly interpreted? Held No; 1) the Fourth Amendment does not automatically freeze all common law at the time, 2) then virtually all felonies were punishable by death, but now many felonies are no longer punishable by death and many misdemeanors have been made felonies, 3) it is now easier to use deadly force from afar, and 4) the common law forbids the use of deadly force against misdemeanants.
People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 (1974)
Lovercamp and co-prisoner escaped from prison to keep from being raped by a group of lesbian prisoners who gave the alternatives of "fuck or fight." Can one use the fear of rape as a defense for the crime of escape? Held Yes; if 1) the prisoner is faced with a threat, 2) there is no time for complaint or complaints have been futile, 3) there is no time to resort to the courts, 4) there is no evidence of force or violence towards others in the escape, and 5) the prisoner immediately reports to proper authorities.
People v. Pena, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14 (1983)
LA County Sheriff's Deputy Webb found defendant and his girlfriend asleep in a parked car. Webb searched defendant's girlfriend, Sara, who was wearing see-through lingerie under her fur coat, having come from a Halloween party. Webb put Sara in his car to take her home, and defendant, fearing Webb's intentions with Sara, followed in the car. Defendant's blood alcohol level categorized him has intoxicated. Held Duress is available as a defense to any crime except taking the life of an innocent person. Does Penal Code section 26, which excepts persons from committing crimes who believe their bodies are in danger, mean durress is not a defense for the protection of a third person? Held Durress is a defense for crimes to protect third parties. Penal Code section 26 does not mean those not enumerated automatically commit crimes. Penal Code sections 692-694, for example, allows resistance against offenses to protect third parties. Held Defendant should be granted jury instructions involving a five-part test for duress [really necessity]: 1) the act was done to prevent a significant evil, 2) there was no alternative, 3) harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the prevented harm, 4) good-faith belief the act is necessary, 5) belief is objectively reasonable under all the circumstances, 6) accused did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency.
People v. Weber, 162 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1 (1984) (skipped)
People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675 (1979)
Police agent kept calling a man at his work and finally bugged him into giving her a note to give to someone else to get heroin. Should the jury be allowed to consider an entrapment defense? Held Yes. California's objective test for entrapment (unlike that of the Supreme Court), which seeks to deter overreaching of police conduct, looks to see if the agent's actions would induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime—the character, predisposition, and subjective intent of the defendant are irrelevant.
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)
Defendant took heroin supplied to him by undercover government agents and, supposedly believing it to be a fake drug, sold it back to undercover government agents. Held Defendant has no entrapment defense because he was predisposed to selling the drug—whether the government agents overstepped their bounds is irrelevant to entrapment (unless the overstepping is really large). If government officials deprived the defendant of a right, the Fifth Amendment would come into play, but that's not entrapment.
People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765 (1985)
Defendant killed his wife because, under a schizophrenic delusion, thought that God allowed the killing of a spouse because of the "til death do us part" clause of the marital vow. Does the California Penal Code Section 25(b) necessitate a showing both of knowledge of the nature and quality of an act; and a knowledge that it is wrong? Held No, showing either one is sufficient. Proposition 8, which reverted the insanity test from that in the Model Penal Code to the M'Naghten rule, didn't intend to put an "and" instead of an "or" between these two tests. The two tests are different and independent. Held It's sufficient that the defendant did not understand the act to be a moral wrong, not that the defendant did not understand the act to be a legal wrong. Held The mistaken belief must stem from a mental disease.
People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565 (1973)
A girl who had schizophrenic tendencies took lots of LSD, which rendered her insane for a few months, even after going off the drugs. Shortly after going off LSD, she thought her mother "had devils" and so defendant tried to kill her. Held The defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity because, complying with the M'Naghten rule, she didn't know right from wrong at that time. It doesn't matter that her insanity was caused by voluntary drug use, only that the insanity was "settled" and in effect separate from the drug use, though not necessarily permanent. Held Defendant was conscious during the act because "she had a sufficient consciousness of acting" and any unawareness was from the drug's effects.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (skipped)
People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878)
Defendant asked Parnell to break into a bank and steal money, but Parnell told the sheriff who told Parnell to go ahead so they could trap the defendant. Parnell stole money from the bank, marked it with acid, gave it to defendant, and then signalled the sheriff, who arrested the defendant. Held Defendant is not guilty of a crime. Although Collins would have been a principal in the crime committed by Parnell, Parnell didn't commit burglary because he robbed with the sheriff's permission. (If defendant is guilty of burglary, then the sheriff would be as well.)
People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (2001) (supplement)
McCoy and Lakey were driving by a corner, when McCoy thought someone was about to shoot at him and shot back, killing a person. Lakey also shot when McCoy started shooting. McCoy got voluntary and attempted manslaughter for unreasonable self-defense. Held Lakey is also guilty as an aider and abettor of whatever McCoy is guilty, because Lakey acted with knowledge of the criminal purpose of McCoy, and with the intent of committing or encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense. Should Lakey's murder and attempted murder be reduced because the conviction of the direct perpetrator was reduced? Held No, once the aider and abettor's actus reas is linked with the direct perpetrator, the mens rea is independent allowing even a higher conviction. (Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor would also be guilty of any natural and probable consequence of the crime of the direct perpetrator.)
People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547 (1984)
Gray and Burk had been telling Beeman about getting ready to rob Beeman's sister-in-law. Testimonies differ, but somehow Beeman drew floor plans, described cars, and gave clothes to Gray and Burk, and the latter two robbed the victim and took the goods back to Beeman, who later claimed to keep them only until he could return them to the victim. Held Defendant must not only have 1) knowledge of the perpetrator's intent and 2) the required actions of assistance, he must also have 3) an intent that those actions will commit, encourage, or facilitate commission of the crime. CALJIC No. 3.01, which requires only that defendant have knowledge of the perpetrator's intent, is therefore erroneous. (The intent to share in the fruits of the crime or to actually do the crime should the perpetrator fail is not needed.) (The liability of the aider and abettor extends to the "natural and reasonable consequences" of the aided acts.)
People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 3d 1158 (1991)
Cooper drove a car with its doors open in a parking lot and two codefendants, who had knocked down an 89-year-old shopper and stole his wallet, jumped inside. Held As Beeman implied, the intent to be an aider and abettor must be formed before the action occurs. Held Although a robbery is committed when loot is removed from the immediate presence of the victim, the commission of the robbery may last longer. Held Aiding and abetting can occur as long as the intent is performed before or during the carrying away of the loot to a place of temporary safety. The purpose of the escape rule, which talks about some ancillary crimes and applies to escape even after the loot has been transported, does not meet the purpose of preventing aiding and abetting. The escape rule would furthermore muddy the distinction between aiding and abetting and accessory after the fact, which is simply helping someone escape after a crime.
People v. Williams, 75 Cal.App.3d 731 (1977)
Defendant had an argument with her ex-boyfriend, and police came and took him away and told defendant not to get her stuff from the house for the time being. Defendant came back with a gun and, leaving her sister outside, went in and started an argument with her ex-boyfriend's brother-in-law. Her sister came in to get defendant and saw her struggling with victim, but did not know that her sister had started it and that the victim was protecting himself. Defendant told her sister to kill him, so her sister drew out her own gun and killed the victim. Held Defendant is guilty of second-degree murder, even though the sister was acquited for defending a third person, because defendant persuaded an innocent person to commit the crime. This reflects old writings on crime, Ceballos in which the defendant used an automatic shooting device when he was not present, and the developing law of liability during felonies that cause a defendant to be liable for shootings performed by even police officers.
In Re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429 (1983)
Joe and Jeff created a suicide pact. Defendant Joseph drove a pickup over a cliff with them both inside, but defendant survived. Held Defendant survivor of a suicide pact is guilty of aiding and abetting a suicide, not murder. Suicide itself is not punishable as a crime either in California or in the Model Penal Code, as it is considered to stem from mental problems Assisting in a suicide in California can be as murder, if done actively, or as a special statutory crime of aiding and abetting a suicide, if solely the means was supplied. The suicide pact is sort of a hybrid because although defendant actively killed the other, he meant to kill them both at the same time. Arguments of fraud or lack of mental illness do not warrent a sentence of murder—this looks more like suicide. Furthermore a sentence of murder would produce anomolies based upon whether the driver of the car or the passenger survived. Therefore a genuine attempted suicide pact should receive an aider and abettor to a suicide sentence, if the suicide pact 1) is voluntary, 2) the instrumentality precluded fraud, and 3) the attempted suicide was simultaneous.
People v. Kauffman, 152 Cal. 331 (1907)
Kaufman and a band of others planned to break into the Cypress Lawn Cemetery in San Mateo, so they got guns and tools. Kaufman was unarmed. Because the cemetery was guarded, they returned to San Francisco. On the way back, they ran into a police officer, shots were fired by members of the group, and the police officer was killed. Held Kauffman can be guilty of the murder because he was part of a conspiracy to commit a theft, and the killing of the officer was the "ordinary and probable effect" of protection of the party from arrest or interference on the way home, which was part of the "common design" of the conspired crime.
People v. Durham, 70 Cal.2d l71 (1969)
Durham and Robinson were stopped by policemen while driving a stolen car after a series of robberies over several weeks. Durham came out of the car and followed the policemen's orders, but Robinson shot and killed a policeman as he came out of the car. Held Durham can be convicted of first-degree murder because Durham assisted Robinson and was involved in a "joint expedition" of a string of robberies, Durham knew that Robinson had and would use a gun, they were in the commission of a crime because they were driving a stolen car, and Robinson's act was a reasonable a probable consequence of this "joint expedition".
People v. Luparello, 187 Cal.App.3d 410 (1986)
Luparello hired some thugs to find out where his lover, who kept going back to her husband, had went off to. Two of the thugs, after planning to rough up a man, came back, lured him out, and shot him. Luparello is charged with first-degree murder because of conspiracy and/or aiding and abetting. Does the underlying crime merge with conspiracy, just like felony-murder in Ireland, taking away the vicarious liability? Held No, felony-murder is something on shaky ground anyway and we don't want to promote it. Felony-murder is meant to persuade people to be careful during the commission of a felony, which doesn't apply here. Here, each conspirator accepts liability for others' actions. Because the other's actions were unplanned and unintended, isn't it a violation of due process to impose the other's mens rea on the defendant? Held No, only the actor can have the mens rea of the crime. The conspirator is charged with a different but equivalent mens rea, that of intentionally encouraging or assisting, which is a voluntary identification with the principal party, which is equivalent to manifesting consent to liability. Because the other person's act is a willful act separate from the mind of the conspirator, wouldn't holding the conspirator liable for the actions of the actor violate our notions of free will? Held No, as public policy we don't want someone who intentionally influences a principal to escape punishment. If someone chooses to become part of a criminal conspiracy, he/she says, "your acts are my acts." Is there enough evidence of premeditation and deliberation to convict defendant of first-degree murder? Held There doesn't have to be—defendant's liabilty is on whatever was the natural and probable consequence of the common design of the conspiracy as determined by the jury. Is there enough evidence to support a determination of natural and probable consequence? Held Yes; defendant wanted information on his lover's whereabouts "at any cost", and he knew the others had weapons and that they were going to rough up some people. But isn't killing a person inconsistent with the defendant's goals of getting information? Held No, there were others who might have information and the killing of one might serve as a warning for others. Concur The problem with the "foreseeable consequence" doctrine is not that it imputes liability but that it improperly fixes the degree of culpability. Defendant should be liable but only for negligence, making this involuntary manslaughter. The Model Penal Code accordingly doesn't have the "foreseeable consequence" doctrine.
People v. Woods, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1570 (1992)
Woods and Windham went looking for Walker, a rival gang member who had shot their friend. Windham waited outside while Woods went into an apartment, questioned and assaulted two females, and shot Johnson. Upon leaving, Windham shot and killed two innocent bystanders, resulting in his conviction of first-degree murder. Does Woods, through vicarious liability, have to be charged with either first-degree murder or nothing? Held No, such an all-or-nothing liability is not required, because it's possible that the second-degree murder was a reasonable and probable consequence of the crime, while the first-degree shooting of an innocent bystander was not, allowing Windham to be liable vicariously of only second-degree murder while the ultimate act of the principal is liable for first-degree murder. Dissent The degree of the murder is irrelevant. If it was foreseeable that Woods would have committed murder, Windham is liable for the murder, of whatever degree.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
Georgia's death penalty (and all the states' death penalties at the time) were unconstitutional because the infrequency of their use created an unacceptable risk of arbitrariness. The death penalty schemes were ""cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
Defendant and another man were hitchhiking and were picked up by the victim. Defendant later killed the two men in the car and stole the car. Georgia sentenced defendant to death. Held A law violates the Eigth Amendment if it doesn't reflect evolving standards of public decency or doesn't uphold the "dignity of man." Held The death penalty in general is constitutional, because it has a purpose: there is surely some deterrence, even though there is no evidence of such, and there is retribution reflecting moral outrage, which gives the public a feeling that the law does its job and prevents vigilante justice. Held The Georgia death penalty is constitutional because 1) the jury is given guiding instructions, 2) there are only certain categories of crimes that can get the death penalty, 3) the jury must take into account the specific circumstances of each case, preventing "freakish" application, 4) the trial is bifurcated into guilt and sentencing phases, and 5) sentences are automatically appealed.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
A 21-year-old girl drove a getaway car for a pawn shop robbery. The robbery went wrong and resulted in the death of the store owner. Georgia law required in certain circumstances that death be imposed for murder, including murder for fleeing after the crime. Georgia law only allowed the following three mitigating circumstances: the victim induced or facilitated the crime, there was coercion, or the defendant had a mental deficiency. Held The Georgia statute is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it precludes consideration of relevant mitigating factors for the individual.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
Coker escaped from prison, raped Mrs. Carver, and stole her car. Georgia allowed the death penalty for rape if 1) prior capital convictions, 2) during the commission of a capital offense, or 3) the rape was outrageous, wantonly vile, etc. Held The death penalty for rape violates the Eighth Amendment because of disproportionality. After Furman, most states didn't allow the death sentence for rape, and now only Georgia allows it for the rape of an adult woman. Nine out of ten juries reject the death penalty for rape. Rape is nowhere near as serious as murder. Georgia doesn't make the death penalty mandatory for murder and only allows it in the case of aggravating circumstances, so it would be inconsistent to allow some murderers to escape the death penalty while applying it to some rapists.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)
Gary Tison was put back in prison after attempting escape and killing a prison guard, so the Tison boys helped him escape again. They smuggled weapons into the prison, drove away in a car, and when that car had a flat tire they flagged down a passing car containing a man and wife, a two-month-old boy, and a 15-year-old girl. At one point Gary Tison and another man killed the family. The Tison boys, having watched the killing, didn't help the victims but continued on with the murderers until they were all captured later. The Tison boys were convicted of felony murder. Does the Eighth Amendment allow the death penalty for felony murder where the participation is major and the mental state is one of reckless indifference to human life? Held Yes. Most jurisdictions allow the death penalty here, even though most jurisdictions as well as Enmund v. Florida don't allow it for felony murder simpliciter (relatively little participation and no intent to kill). Reckless disregard for human life is sometimes just as culpable as an explicit intent to kill. Dissent Rather than determining whether the sentence is actually proportional, the majority creates a new category of crime. The argument that reckless disregard for human life can be as dangerous as an intent to kill doesn't apply here, because unlike that example the defendants here did not in fact kill. The jurisdiction analysis ignored jurisdictions that abolished the death penalty or allowed it only in different circumstances—if those would have been included, those allowing the death penalty for cases like this one would be in the minority. The only other case in Arizona in which one sentenced to death neither killed nor intended to kill was Enmund, which was declared unconstitutional.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
McCleskey, a black man, killed a white security guard while robbing a store. The Baldus Study statistically showed that in Georgia, even after taking into account non-racial variables, defendants killing white victims were over four times as likely to receive the death sentence than those killing black victims, and that black victims who kill white victims have the highest probability of receiving the death penalty. Held The Baldus Study does not show that Georgia death penalty violates the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment in its prejudiced application. The American judicial system was built upon jury discretion. There are safeguards in place to prevent racial bias. Following McCleskey's argument to its logical conclusion, such disparities might be found throughout the justice system, based upon all sorts of variables such as facial structure or attraciveness. Determining sentences is for the legislature, anyway. Dissent Discretion is a means, not an end, and should not be used to differentiate based upon race. The Baldus Study is emperical proof that safeguards aren't working. The slippery slope argument on first glance seems to be critical of too much justice, but even if the presence of imperfections is regarded as inevitable, the death penalty is unique and has a greater need to have imperfections removed in sentencing. Race is a unique factor as well, specially needful of the absence of prejudice. The court would fulfill its role by scrutinizing the death penalty.

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Copyright © 2002-2003 Garret Wilson