Review: To End a War, Revised Edition

Title: To End a War, Revised Edition
Author: Richard Holbrooke
Publisher: New York: The Modern Library, 1999
ISBN: 0-375-75360-5

The first time I approached To End a War, Richard Holbrooke's play-by-play story of negotiating an end to the war in Bosnia, I stumbled before even arriving at Dayton. The monotonous squabbles and ridiculous quarrels were hardly as "enthralling" as the New York Times had proclaimed on the book's cover. Holbrooke's account of his dealing with the Croatians, Bosnians, and Serbs was no doubt realistic, I though, but I had other reading priorities.

A trip to the region (Croatia) this summer brought the relevance needed to rekindle my curiosity. Starting the book again, I found the endless wranglings to be, if not enthralling, at least somewhat exciting. At times the meetings seemed familiar, bringing memories of work in which I've participated in standards organizations. At other times, the participants' actions become extreme as to be childlike in their refusals to agree or to even get along.

Overall, the book provides a wonderful insight into what actually goes into sealing an international deal—world leaders in a closed room makeing agreements, sometimes arbitrary, that will affect the lives of thousands in some other region of the globe. Holbrooke, who consistently kept a journal of the events, recounts everything in detail. He includes the prejudices and psychological tricks that each side (including the United States) contributed to the quest to create something positive and end bloodshed.

Two themes seem to underlie Mr. Holbrooke's story. The first is his intense pessimism, if not prejudice, towards positive Serb contributions.

I was beginning to get a sense of the Pale Serbs: headstrong, given to empty theatrical statements, but in the end, essential bullies when their bluff was called. The Western mistake over the previous four years had been to treat the Serbs as rational people with whom one could argue, negotiate, compromise, and agree. In fact, they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it. (152).

Holbrooke is well aware of his feelings, and perhaps considers this simply a "sizing-up" of one of the players in the negotiations. As if to temper the tone of this anti-Serbian theme, he remarks towards the end of the book, "[T]he majority of Serbs in the former Yugoslavia were ordinary people who did not kill anyone," continuing with, "although, like many 'good Germans' during the Third Reich, a large number remained silent or passive in the face of something they admitted later they knew was wrong." (371).

The second theme is Holbrooke's respect, if not awe, for then President Clinton. Throughout most of the proceedings Clinton plays no direct role—in fact, Holbrooke is hesitant to bring the president to meet the delegates until the proper place in the negotiations. Discussions with the Clintons are described as if Holbrooke had journeyed to a foreign land to consult some wise seer on a mountainside. At other time his praises of President's Clinton's participation would seem appropriate of child discussing a childhood hero. No doubt Holbrooke does have a deep respect for the Clintons. Simultaneously, though, Holbrooke seems to be illustrating his respect for the office of the presidency, as well as its place within the negotiation framework. It may not always be appropriate for the president to work closely with a negotiation; presidential intercession, in this arrangement, can be used most effectively when used sparingly and with great respect.

Notes

"Thus arose an idea that 'ancient hatreds,' a vague but useful term for history too complicated (or trivial) for outsiders to master, made it impossible (or pointless) for anyone outside the region to try to prevent the conflict." (22).
"Slovenia's departure from Yugoslavia made it easier for Milosevic to create a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs, since it removed from the country a republic with almost no Serbs." (29).
In getting NATO to bomb Bosnia, a "big break" came on 19 August 1995 when UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was unreachable on a commercial aircraft, so Ambassador Albright dealt directly with his deputy, Kofi Annan, who would later become secretary-general. With Boutros-Ghali unavailable, Annan "instructed the U.N.'s civilian officials and military commanders to relinquish for a limited period of time their authority to veto air strikes in Bosnia. For the first time in the war, the decision on the air strikes was solely in the hands of NATO…." (99).
"Our negotiating team had already developed an internal dynamic that combined bantering, fierce but friendly argument, and tight internal discipline. Complete trust and openness among all seven of us were essential if we were to avoid energy-consuming factional intrigues and back channels to Washington." (111).
"[A]rguments over the location and 'hosting' of meetings may seem comical, but they were a constant and time-consuming subplot of the negotiations. In fact, disagreements over substance were rarely as intense as those concerning procedure and protocol." (117).
I was beginning to get a sense of the Pale Serbs: headstrong, given to empty theatrical statements, but in the end, essential bullies when their bluff was called. The Western mistake over the previous four years had been to treat the Serbs as rational people with whom one could argue, negotiate, compromise, and agree. In fact, they respected only force or an unambiguous and credible threat to use it. (152).
When press reports of the negotiating sitution were inaccurate but conveyed the public message Washington wanted, the negotiating team did not correct them. (166).
General Rupert Smith had a pessimistic view of the likelihood of eliminating checkpoints in Bosnia. "Bosnia is a country where every boy grows up with the dream that someday he will own his own checkpoint." (187).
The Dayton conference rooms had six channels with headsets so that participants could listen to proceedings in their own language. The first three were for English, French, and Russian. The other three channels reflected the intense nationalism within the parties, with "[n]ationalistic leaders … aggressively developing distinctive vocabularies for each ethnic group." The channels were devoted for Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, respectively—even though only one interpreter translated for those tree channels. (232).
The "real Dayton" beyond the confines of the base, it seems, is the birthplace of the Wright brothers. (234).
A special unit of the Defense Mapping Agency brought to dayton a virtual reality machine to help the parties with boundary negotiations. "The entire country of Bosnia had been filmed and [was] visible in three dimensions, accurate down to two yards." (283).
The team would negotiate on semantics of individual words. One compromise allowed the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to "supervise" the preparation and "conduct" of elections. Holbrooke didn't think this phrasing was quite perfect, but thought it "strong enough so that the OSCE could interpret it any way it wanted to." (290).
Not all negotiating tactics worked. Once Holbrooke tried to create a deadline, asking members to pack their bags and starting to collect payment of bills from the parties. The bags were placed outside, and the Air Force put them on a truck to take them to the air strip.
Of all the gambits we tried at Dayton, this proved to be the most pathetic. Everyone saw through our bluff; nobody else made the slightest effort to prepare for departure. Early in the evening, we gave up and brought the bags back to our rooms. (293–294).
It seems that issues of pride came from all quarters. At the formal signing ceremony at the Élysée Palace in France, "The French Foreign Ministry called the Dayton Peace Agreement the 'Treaty of Élysée,' and asked the speakers to omit any references to Dayton in their remarks." (322).
"[T]he majority of Serbs in the former Yugoslavia were ordinary people who did not kill anyone, although, like many 'good Germans' during the Third Reich, a large number remained silent or passive in the face of something they admitted later they knew was wrong." (371).